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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Investment Companies and Their Regulation
Statutory definitions aside, an investment company can generally be
thought of as any arrangement by which a number of persons invest money
in a company that is itself engaged in the business of investing in
securities.' Such investment companies (i.e., mutual funds) engage in a
number of activities, including the issuance of securities and securities
trading. As a result, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)2 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 3 (collectively, Securities
Acts) provide numerous disclosure and anti-fraud protections to investors
1. For a full discussion ofthe statutory definition of "investment company," see discussion
infra Part II.
2. The 1933 Act is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2005).
3. The 1934 Act is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-nn (2005).
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associated with investment companies.4 However, in a pre-1940 study of
investment companies, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) discovered a plethora of abuses unique to investment companies
that went unchecked by the Securities Acts.5 Affiliated transactions
between an investment company's insiders and the investment company
itself were among the most pronounced abuses enriching insiders to the
detriment of the investment company and its shareholders." Congress
concluded that these abuses resulted from the "completely liquid, mobile,
and readily negotiable" nature of investment company assets, which
provided "manifold opportunities for exploitation by the unscrupulous
management of some companies."' As a result of the Pre 1940 SEC Study,

4. See generally supra notes 2-3.
5. Seegenerally SEC Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies
(1938-1940) [hereinafter Pre-1940 SEC Study]. The Investment Trust Study was submitted to
Congress in five parts. THE ORGIN, SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF THE STUDY, NATURE, AND
CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE

INVESTMENT TRUST AND INVESTMENT COMPANY MOVEMENT INTHE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938); STATISTICAL SURVEY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); ABUSES AND
DEFICIENCIES INTHE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, ch. 1-6, H.R. DOC. No. 279, 76th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1939-1940); ch. 7,H.R.DOC.NO.
136, 77th Cong., 1st Sss. 1 (1941) [hereinafter Pre-1940 SEC Study Part III]; CONTROL AND
INFLUENCE OVER INDUSTRY, AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R.
DOC. No.246,77th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1941); CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, H.R. Doc.
No. 246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1941). Additionally, there were six supplemental reports.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN GREAT BRITAIN, H.R. DoC. No. 380, 76th Cong., 1st Sss. 1 (1939);
COMMINGLED OR COMMON TRUST FUNDS ADMINISTERED BY BANKS AND TRUST COMPANmS, H.R.
DOC.NO. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939); INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT,
INVESTMENT SUPERViSORYAND INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES, H.R. DOC. No. 477, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1939); COMPANIES SPONSORING INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS, H.R. DOC. No.482,
76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939); FIxED AND SEMIFIXED INVESTMENT TRUSTS, H.R. DOC. No. 567,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); and COMPANIES ISSUING FACE AMOUNT INSTALLMENT
CERTIFICATES, H.R. DOC. No. 659, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
6. Insiders were using investment companies as capital sources for their own personal
business ventures and as captive markets to turn their own unsalable securities into cash. See Pre1940 SEC Study, supranote 5, at 2640-2720. Managers were allowed to buy investment company
shares below net asset value, diluting the value of other investor's shares. See id. at 1923. Some
investment companies contracted under advisory agreements that were often long-term and
noncancellable. See id.at 1920-22.
7. Senate Report No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., at 6 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Report].
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Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 19408 to supplement the
Securities Acts in regulating the activities of investment companies.9
In order to give the 1940 Act wide breadth in coverage, Congress
broadly defined "company" and "investment company" under the 1940
Act. 0 Congress did, however, exempt from their definition certain
investment vehicles under the 1940 Act despite such vehicles falling
within the 1940 Act's technical definition of "investment company.""
Many of these entities were exempted on the basis that their investment
activities were ancillary to another purpose that was the fundamental
object of their enterprises. 2 Not surprisingly, many of these entities were
already subject to other state or federal statutes (e.g., banks and insurance
companies). 3

Other entities, however, were exempted on the basis that their "private"
offerings were made either (1) to a small enough number of investors so
as to not warrant a public interest under the 1940 Act, 14 or (2) to
sophisticated enough investors who can fend for themselves without the
protective safeguards of the 1940 Act or Securities Acts. 5 Investment
funds offering their securities pursuant to these two exemptions are
generally referred to as "private funds" or "private investment
companies." 6 Today, hedge funds, venture capital funds, and private
equity funds are offered to investors utilizing these two private fund
offering exemptions.

8. The Investment Company Act of 1940 is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 80a-1
to 80a-64 (2005) [hereinafter 1940 Act]. All citations to 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-I to 80a-64 may be
abbreviated, as with 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a omitted.
9. See SEC Report to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Policy
ImplicationsofInvestment Company Growth, H.R. REP. No.2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 65-66
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 Report].
10. See id. at 33 n. 1. See discussion infra Part II; infra text accompanying note 36; see
generally 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 80a-2(8), 80a-3(a)(1).
11. See generally § 3.
12. See 1966 Report, supra note 9, at 34-35.

13. See generally §3(cX3) (exempting from the definition of investment company"Any bank
or insurance company; any savings and loan association, building and loan association, cooperative
bank, homestead association, or similar institution, or any receiver, conservator, liquidator,
liquidating agent, or similar official or person thereof or therefor; or any common trust fund or
similar fund...").
14. See 1966 Report, supra note 9, at 34-35. See generally § 3(cX 1); discussion infra Part
II.A. See also SEC REPORT, PROTECTGINVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
REGULATION 104-06 (1992) (on file with the author) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS].

15. See generally § 3(c)(7); discussion infra Part II.B; cf.Private Investment Companies,
Release No. IC-22405, Part II.A (Dec. 18, 1996).
16. See generally Private Investment Companies, supra note 15, Part II.A.
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B. Hedge Funds
Hedge funds, like registered investment companies (i.e., mutual funds),
are engaged in the business of issuing securities to investors and investing
their assets into pools of securities, which are managed by an investment
adviser. While the term "hedge fund" is commonly attributed to funds
engaged in hedging strategies, the term encompasses a much broader array
of funds with strategies varying from arbitrage to long-only equity, and
everything else in between.'" Accordingly, hedge funds can generally be
defined as entities that are exempt from registration as investment
companies under the 1940 Act and whose interests, which are redeemable,
are not sold publicly. 8
By circumventing registration, hedge funds avoid the highly
burdensome regulations and limitations that the 1940 Act imposes upon
investment companies, including, inter alia, registration under the 1933
and 1940 Acts, board and independent director oversight, prohibitions on
affiliated transactions, daily net annual value (NAV) valuations,
diversification requirements, daily redemptions, prospectus deliveries,
liquidity standards, SEC periodic reporting, detailed books and record
keeping, and the 1934 Act's proxy rules.1 9 Furthermore, with respect to
17. SEC StaffReport to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Implications
of the Growth of Hedge Funds, at 3, 5 [hereinafter SEC Hedge Fund Report], at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). Additionally,
the investment holdings of hedge funds may also vary significantly (e.g., inter alia, equity
securities, fixed income securities, convertible securities, currencies, exchange traded futures,
derivatives). Id.
18. Id. Likewise, venture capital and private equity funds, which typically invest in
unregistered illiquid securities and start up companies, respectively, are not registered as investment
companies with the SEC and do not publicly sell interests therein. Id. at 7-9. Venture capital and
private equity funds also rely upon section 3(c) exemptions to avoid regulation under the 1940 Act
as well. See Marc F. Holzapfel, An Analysis ofthe Section 3(a)(10) Exemption Under the Securities
Act of 1933 in the Context of the Public Offering Component of Section 3(c)(1) ofthe Investment
Company Act of 1940, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 427, 430 (2003); see also Bryn Vaaler,
Financing a Small Business in Mississippi:A Practitioner's Guide to Federal and State Securities
Exemptions, 63 Miss. L.J. 129, 152 (1993). However, such funds are distinguishable from hedge
funds in a number of respects. Unlike hedge funds, which typically allow redemptions upon written
notice thirty days prior to withdrawal, venture capital, and private equity funds generally require
investments to be committed to the life of the fund, often require capital calls for prospective
investment acquisitions of the fund, and value their shares far more infrequently than hedge funds.
Additionally, private equity fimds and venture capital funds are more notorious for playing active
roles in the management of the companies they invest in. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note
17, at 7-9.
19. See THoMAs P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDs: REGULATION
AND COMPUANCE 82-84 (2004-2005 ed.); Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Private Investment
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investment activities, hedge funds can better utilize leverage and short
selling2 ° while taking advantage of performance fees, all of which, are not
as readily available to registered investment companies. 2 Hedge funds
also tend to be more nimble than their behemoth mutual fund siblings are
for investing purposes.22
Over the past 15 years in particular, the less regulated and more
flexible environment that hedge funds operate in have proved to be highly
attractive to both investment managers and investors. From 1990 to 2004,
the number of hedge funds increased from 2,000 to 8,000, respectively.23
Over the same time period, hedge fund assets experienced even more
dramatic growth, increasing from $50 billion in 1990 to over $1 trillion in
2004.24 Over the next three years, hedge fund assets are expected to grow
at a compound annual growth rate of 15% with assets expected to total
over $2 trillion in 2008.25
In light of the increasing prevalence of hedge funds, this Note will
collectively consider the primary regulatory, tax, and organizational
considerations that must be taken into account when structuring hedge
funds onshore and offshore for purposes of offering security interests
therein to U.S. residents; the implications of making sales to non-U.S.

Companies UnderSection 3(c)(1) ofthe Investment CompanyAct of1940,44 BUS. LAW. 401,403
(1989).
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-18(f)(l) (prohibiting an open-end registered investment
company from utilizing any leverage unless its assets cover 300% of all borrowings). Regarding
short selling, registered investment companies must ensure that their prospectuses and disclosure
documents sufficiently inform investors of the risks associated with short selling. See Form, N-1A,
Items 4 and 12, availableat http://www.sec.gov/about/formnsformn-la.pdf (last visited Dec. 21,
2005). For additional information that must be provided regarding short sales, see generally
Regulation S-X (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. 210) and Rules 6-04, 6-07, 6-10, and 12-12A
thereunder.
21. 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-5(a)(l) prohibits a registered investment adviser from utilizing certain
performance fees. Rule 205-3 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3) under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (2005) [hereinafter Advisers
Act]) exempts advisers from charging performance fees to certain qualified clients that have at least
$750,000 USD invested with the adviser or have a personal net worth of at least $1.5M USD. Since
existing hedge fund advisers are typically not registered, such limitations on performance fees are
not presently applicable to them.
22. Cf.generally Cynthia A. Glassman, Statement by SEC Commissioner at Open Meeting
Considering Proposed Registration Underthe Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers (noting
the liquidity and lubricating effect that hedge funds provide for the U.S. financial system), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch07l404cag.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2005).
23. Soros Sorrows, PRIVATE BANKER INT'l, June 30, 2005, at 15.
24. Alan B. Krueger, Those Lofty Reported Returns Show That Hedge Funds Are More
Skilled at ManagingDatathan ManagingMoney, a Study Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2004, at Cl.
25. Hedge Funds to Reach $2 Trillion by 08, INvESTMENT MGMT. WKLY., Oct. 3,2005.
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investors will also be addressed since such sales may affect the
organizational structure of a hedge fund. Accordingly, Part H of this Note
will survey the exemptions and limitations primarily under the 1940 Act
that onshore and offshore hedge funds must generally adhere to if U.S.
laws or residents are applicable. Part III will address the implications of
allowing certain employee benefit plan investors to own interests in a
hedge fund. Parts IV and V will address the considerations that must be
taken into account when a hedge fund invests in "new issues" or
commodities, respectively. Part VI will touch base on select tax issues
raised with respect to certain investors acquiring interests in onshore and
offshore hedge funds. Part VH will discuss basic organizational options,
including "side by side" and "master feeder" funds.
II. "HEDGE FUND" EXEMPTIONS AND REGULATIONS
The 1940 Act generally defines an investment company as, inter alia,
any issuer26 that "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities.... . 27 Investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities
is unmistakably the core fundamental business activity of hedge funds.
Furthermore, fund sponsors, generally through their private placement
offering memorandums, unequivocally hold themselves out to potential
investors as being engaged or proposing to be engaged primarily in such
activities. Accordingly, but for the exemptions provided under sections

3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act, discussed more fully below, hedge

26. An "Issuer" means every person that issues or proposes to issue any security, or has
outstanding any security which it has issued. 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(aX22). Since the interests that
hedge funds issue in their limited partnerships qualify as securities under 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a2(a)(36), hedge funds qualify as issuers for purposes of section 3(a). See alsogenerallySEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,301 (1946) (stating that an investment contract is a transaction involving
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others).
27. § 3(aXl)(A). Note that if an investment entity did not qualify as an investment company
under section 3(a)(l)(A) (e.g., it was not "primarily" engaged in the business of investing in
securities or it unexpectedly acquired or held a large interest in securities), it would most likely
qualify as an investment company under section 3(aX1XC). Section 3(aXl)(C) states thatan issuer
is an investment company if it "is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding,or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities having a value exceeding 40 percentum of the value of such issuer's total assets." Id.
(emphasis added).
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funds would otherwise fall within the definition of an investment company
and, as a result, be required to register under section 8 of the 1940 Act.2
A. Section 3(c)(1)
Section 3(c)(1) exempts from the defmition of investment company
"Any issuer whose outstanding securities... are beneficially owned by
not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities." 29 To comply
with section 3(c)(1), a hedge fund must satisfy two requirements. First, a
hedge fund must not have more than 100 persons beneficially owning its
securities.30 Second, a hedge fund must not make a public offering of its
securities.' This exemption reflects the congressional view that privately
placed investment companies with a limited number of investors do not
rise to the level of federal interest necessary to warrant public protection
under the 1940 Act. 32 The exemption also reflects a pragmatic approach
taken by the SEC that such funds would be administratively inconvenient
to regulate given the plethora of such funds and the limited number of
investors holding interests therein.33
1. Beneficial Owners
Knowing the number of beneficial owners in a 3(c)(1) fund is critical.
With the exception of certain circumstances limited to foreign funds, a
fund that relies on section 3(c)(1) may be subject to registration as an
investment company if it exceeds the 100 beneficial owner limitation.34
28. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-7(a).

29. § 3(cXl) (emphasis added). Hedge funds complying with the provisions ofsection 3 will
hereinafter be referred to as hedge funds, 3(cXlI) funds, 3(c)(1) companies, 3(c)(7) funds, 3(c)(7)
companies, 3(c) funds, and onshore hedge funds or onshore funds.
30. See § 3(cXl).
31. See id. There is little precedent regarding what constitutes "presently proposing" to make
a public offering of securities; commentators generally agree that if an issuer is considering a future
public offering, that fact alone would not automatically mean such issuer is "presently proposing"
an offering under section 3(cXl). See, e.g., Lemke & Lins, supranote 19, at 429. However, overt
or identifiable actions by the issuer, such as a board resolution to go public, would most likely
satisfy the "presently proposing" provision. See id.
32. See 1966 Report, supra note 9, at 34-35.
33. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 19, at 402 (citing Paradise & Alberts, SEC No-Action
Letter (Sept. 27, 1976)).
34. The SEC's staff would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if:
a fund organized outside the United States that is not registered under the [1940
Act], permits more than 100 U.S. residents to remain beneficial owners of the
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Furthermore, the fund's general partner or promoter could be subject to
criminal penalties, administrative actions, injunctive relief prohibiting the
hedge fund from continuing to do business until it registers under the 1940
Act, or private actions for rescission of losses or advisory fees.
Accordingly, a 3(c)(1) fund must continuously monitor its investors.
Naturally, in order to monitor the number of investors for purposes of
complying with section 3(c)(1), a hedge fund must first determine who its
beneficial owners are. The SEC considers any "person" with an ownership
interest in a company's debt or equity securities to be a beneficial owner
under section 3(c)(1).31 Section 2(a)(28) defines a "person" as any "natural
person or company." 36 Generally, any natural person or company will
count as a single beneficial owner in a hedge fund. 7 Interests owned
jointly by a husband and wife will be counted as a single beneficial
owner.38 Additionally, non-U.S. individuals or entities holding interests in

fund's securities, if(1) the fund has not publicly offered or sold its securities in the
United States; (2) the fund and its agents or affiliates have not engaged in
activities that could reasonably be expected, or are intended, to condition the U.S.
market with respect to the fund's securities, such as placing an advertisement in
a U.S. publication; (3) the fund and its agents or affiliates have not engaged in
activities that could reasonably be expected, or are intended, to facilitate
secondary market trading in the United States with respect to the fund's securities;
(4) the fund and its agents or affiliates have not knowingly engaged in a deliberate
marketing strategy, adopted directly by the fund's manager or other entity
responsible for the business and affairs of the fund, that is calculated to result in
the sale of securities to foreign investors who are relocating to the United States;
(5) the 100 U.S. investor limit is exceeded solely because Non-U.S. Holders (i.e.,
beneficial owners who purchased their securities while residing outside the United
States) have relocated to the United States; (6) the fund's activities with respect
to Non-U.S. Holders are limited to providing the following services: (a) the
mailing of securityholder reports, account statements, proxy statements and other
materials that are required to be provided by foreign law and the fund's governing
documents; (b) the processing of redemption requests and payment of dividends
and distributions; (c) the mechanical processing of transfers of ownership; and (d)
the issuance of securities pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan.
Investment Funds Institute of Canada, SEC No-Action Letter 2 (Mar. 4, 1996).
35. See Lemke & Lins, supranote 19, at 406.
36. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(aX28); see also 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(a)(8) (defining a company
to include a corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, and fund, inter alia).
37. But see discussion infra Part II.A.2.
38. See Privately Offered Investment Companies, SEC Release No. IC-22597 at II.A.4. n.69
(Apr. 3, 1997).
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a hedge fund are counted toward the 100 beneficial owner limitation if the
3(c)(1) fund is organized in the United States.39
2. Vertical Integration
Congress was concerned that certain investors would try to circumvent
the 100 beneficial owner limitation by collectively forming a single entity,
which in turn would invest all of its assets in the 3(c)(1) fund under the
guise of a single beneficial owner. To thwart such arrangements, Congress
incorporated a look-through provision into section 3(c)(1), which was
significantly amended under the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 19 9 60A Under the newer look-through test, an investing entity will

count as a single beneficial owner UNLESS: (1) the investing entity owns

39. This distinction is a critical factor in advising fimds, which plan to have non-U.S.
investors, to form offshore hedge funds for their non-U.S. investors. See discussion infraPart VII.A
and accompanying notes.
40. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416, § 209 (1996) (hereinafter NSMIA] (amending the look-through provisions pertaining to
section 3(cXl) companies by amending subparagraph (A) ofsection 3(c)(1)). Before NSMIA, under
section 3(cX 1), two 10% tests existed for purposes of determining whether the 3(cX1) company's
investors satisfied the 100 beneficial owner test. The first 10% test required 3(cXl) funds to
determine whether any investing entity in the 3(cXl) fund owned 10% or more of the 3(c)(1) fund.
If so, then a second 10% test required the 3(cXl) fund to count the underlying investors of the
investing entity IF such entity's holding in the 3(cX1) fund comprised ten percent or more of such
investing entity's assets. The purpose of these tests was to thwart companies from forming and
investing solely for purposes of investing in the 3(c)(1) fund in order to avoid the 100 beneficial
owner restriction. See Caldwalader Firm Memo, SecuritizationlAssetFinanceUpdate (Nov./Dec.
1996), at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/newsletter/SecNov-Dec%2096.pdf#search=
'1996/o20Securitieso2OMarkets%2Olmprovement%2OAct%2lookld2through%2Oten%2Oper
cent%20test' (last visited on Dec. 22, 2005); Lemke & Lins, supra note 19, at 410-21. However,
once NSMIA was enacted, 3(cXl) funds were no longer required to count the underlying
shareholders of its corporate, non-investment pooled, investors under any circumstances. See Willa
E. Gibson, Is Hedge FundRegulationNecessary? 73 TEMP. L. REv. 681, 715 n. 105 (2000).
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10% or more of the voting securities" of the 3(c)(1) company; AND (2)
the investing entity is itself an investment company, 3(c)(1) company, or

3(c)(7) company. 42
If (1) and (2) apply, then the underlying security holders of the
investing entity must be counted when computing the 3(c)(1) fund's
beneficial owners.43 If only (1) or (2) apply, then the investing entity will
only count as a single beneficial owner." Additionally, given the potential
for manipulation in multi-tiered transactions, the SEC has also stated that
if an entity is formed for the sole purpose of investing in a section 3(c)(1)
company, then such an entity's underlying investors may be counted
toward the 3(c)(1) company's beneficial owners.45 Such a determination
requires a detailed fact specific inquiry. An entity may, however, be
presumed to have been formed for the purpose of investing in a 3(c)(1)
company where such an entity has invested more than 40% of its
committed capital in the securities of a 3(c)(1) company.'
3. Knowledgeable Employees
Rule 3c-5 under the 1940 Act exempts interests held in a 3(c) fund by
the general partner 7 and certain "knowledgeable employees," as discussed
more fully below, for purposes of determining the number of beneficial

41. 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(a)(42) (defining a "voting security" as any security "presently
entitling the owner or holder thereof to vote for the election of directors of a company."). The SEC
has taken the view that "limited partnership interests may be analogous to voting securities when
a limited partner has the right to dismiss and replace the general partner or partners of the
partnership." Weiss, Peck & Greer Venture Associates II, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 10,
1990). It should also be noted that the SEC, in numerous No-Action letters, has taken the view that
a limited partnership interest is a voting security if the limited partner has an economic interest
giving it the power to exercise a controlling influence in the partnership. See, e.g., Wells Fargo
Alternative Asset Management, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 26, 2005). But, a limited
partner's interest in a limited partnership is not a voting security, if the limited partner has no right
to influence the limited partnership's management or remove or replace its general partner (other
than for cause or under other special circumstances). See Lemke and Lins, supranote 19, at 415.
42. See § 3(cX1XA).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Cf Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 23, 1992); Handy Place
Investment Partnership, SEC No-Action Letter (July 19, 1989).

46. Cf.id.
47. But see 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-47(a) (prohibiting doing indirectly that which cannot be done
directly, would likely, under certain circumstances, cause issuances of an interest in the general
partner to certain employees, friends, and family thereof to be counted toward the 3(cXl) fund's
beneficial owners in order to prevent such non-knowledgeable employees from hiding behind the
knowledgeable employee status of the general partner).
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owners in a 3(c)(1) fund." Knowledgeable employees are meant to include

those individuals actively participating in the overall portfolio
management of the 3(c)(1) fund's investments.49 The policy behind the
exemption is that knowledgeable employees ought to be encouraged to
have vested interests in the funds that they oversee; they will be more
attuned to the interests of the fund's investors as a result of being exposed
to the same risks as their investors.

A knowledgeable employee is defined as an executive officer,"0
director, trustee, general partner, board member, a person serving in a
similar capacity as the preceding positions, or an "Affiliated Management
Person"' of a hedge fund (Knowledgeable Employees). Under certain
circumstances, Knowledgeable Employees may also include other

48. See 17 C.F.R. 270.3c-5 [hereinafter Rule 3c-5].
49. See Michael R. Butowsky, Private Investment Companies: Exceptions under Sections
3(C)(1) and 3(C)(7) ofthe Investment Company Act of 1940, ALI-ABA COURSE No. SF33 (Oct.
2000).
50. Persons qualifying as an "Executive Officer" include the president, vice presidents in
charge of a principal business function, division, or unit (i.e., sales, administration, or finance),
other officers performing a policy-making function, or other persons performing similar policymaking functions, for a hedge fund or for an Affiliated Management Person of the hedge fund. See
Rule 3c-5(aX3).
51. An "Affiliated Management Person" means an affiliated person, as defined in 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 80a-2(aX3) under the 1940 Act [hereinafter § 2(a)], that manages the investment activities of a
3(c) fund. See Rule 3c-5(a)(1). Section 2(a)(3) defines an "Affiliated person" of another person as
follows:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power
to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other
person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting
securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote,
by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director,
partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is
an investment comvanv, any investment adviser [as defined in Section 2(aX20)
under the 1940 Act] thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F)
if such other person is an unincorporated investment comnanv not having a board
of directors, the depositor thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). As underlined above, section 2(aX3) makes references to an "investment
company." As previously discussed, however, 3(c) funds are normally exempted from the definition
of an investment company. See discussion supra Part II.A & II.B. Accordingly, in order to make
the definition of "affiliated persons" found in section 2(aX3XE) and (F) applicable to 3(c) funds,
Rule 3c-5(a)(1) specifically deems 3(c) funds to be included within the definition of an investment
company for purposes of section 2(aX3). Compare Rule 3c-5(a)(1), (2), with § 2(aX3XE) & (F).
52. Rule 3c-5(aX4Xi).
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employees or affiliates of a 3(c) fund (excluding employees performing
solely clerical, secretarial, or administrative functions).13 Marketing
professionals, research analysts, attorneys, brokers, traders, and financial,
compliance, operations or accounting officers do not generally qualify as
Knowledgeable Employees.54 The Knowledgeable Employee
determination is made at the time of purchase.55 Interests held in a 3(c)
fund by an entity owned exclusively by Knowledgeable Employees are not
counted toward the 100 beneficial owner test.5 6 A Knowledgeable
Employee holding interests in a 3(c) fund jointly with his or her spouse
57
would not be counted toward the 100 beneficial owner test either.
Finally, interests held in a 3(c) fund by a person who received such
interests from a Knowledgeable Employee through a gift, bequest, or
divorce settlement would not be counted toward the 100 beneficial owner
limitation. 8
4. Horizontal Integration
The SEC utilizes an integration concept in determining whether two or
more 3(c)(1) companies should be combined for purposes of determining
whether the 100 beneficial owner limitation has been satisfied.59 In effect,
integration allows the SEC to look through seemingly separate issuers to

53. Knowledgeable Employees may also include certain employees of the 3(c) fund or:
an Affiliated Management Person of the [3(c) fund] ... who, in connection with
his or her regular functions or duties, participates in the investment activities of
such [3(c) fund], other [3(c) funds], or investment companies the investment
activities of which are managed by such Affiliated Management Person of the
[3(c) fund], provided that such employee has been performing such functions and
duties for or on behalf of the [3(c) fund] or the Affiliated Management Person of
the [3(c) fund], or substantially similar functions or duties for or on behalf of
another company for at least 12 months.
Rule 3c-5(aX4Xii).
54. Butowsky, supranote 49.
55. See Rule 3c-5(bX 1).
56. See Rule 3c-5(bX2).
57. See American Bar Ass'n Section of Business Law, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 22,
1999).
58. See Rule 3c-5(bX3).
59. See generally Equitable Capital Management Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan.
6, 1992); Monument Capital Management, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 12, 1990); Prescott,
Ball & Turben Covered Option Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 17, 1979).
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determine whether they actually constitute the same issuer.' The policy
behind the integration concept is to prevent sponsors from continuously
forming similar 3(c)(1) companies when previous 3(c)(1) companies reach
100 beneficial owners."1 In determining whether integration is appropriate,
the SEC considers whether a reasonable investor, qualified to invest in two
or more of the related entities relying on section 3(c)(1), "would consider
the interests to be materially different." 62 The entities' investment
objectives, portfolio securities, and portfolio risk and return characteristics
are highly relevant in making this determination.63
While the reasonable investor test is the primary consideration used for
integration purposes, the SEC may also look at the five factor test used in
determining integration under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.64 By statute,
3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) funds sharing the same strategy will generally not be
integrated when determining the number of beneficial owners under
3(c)(1).' 5 Furthermore, U.S. and non-U.S. cloned funds (discussed more
fully below in Parts VII.B and VII.C) will not be integrated under most
circumstances. 66
5. Public Offering
The second element of section 3(c)(1) is the requirement to not make
a public offering. "Public Offering" is not defined anywhere in the 1940
Investment Company Act. Accordingly, the SEC has interpreted the term
"public offering" in section 3(c)(1) as having the same meaning as "public
offering" under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.67 The extension of section
60. See Pasadena Investment Trust, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 22,1993); Joseph H. Moss,
SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1984).

61. Cf. id.
62. Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, SEC No-Action Letter 9 (June 18, 1993).
63. Id.
64. See Equitable Capital Management Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 6, 1992).
The five factor test under the 1933 Act considers (1) whether the different offerings are part of a
single plan of financing; (2) whether they involve the issuance of the same class of securities; (3)
whether the offerings are made at or about the same time; (4) whether the same type of
consideration is received; and (5) whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose. See
generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a); Securities Act Rel. No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
65. See § 3(c)(7)(E). But see Privately Offered Investment Companies, SEC Release No. IC22597, SEC LEXIS 739, 78-79 (Apr. 3, 1997) (stating that "the Non-Integration Provision,
however, is not intended to allow a sponsor ofan existing section 3(c)(1) Fund nominally to convert
that fund into a section 3(c)(7) Fund, and then to create another section 3(c)(1) Fund ('Related
Section 3(c)(1) Fund') thereby avoiding the 100-investor limit").
66. See Shoreline Fund, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 11, 1994).
67. See ING Bank, N.V., SEC No-Action Letter n.8 (July 8, 2002). Section 4(2) under the
1933 Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 77d(2)] exempts from the registration and prospectus requirements of
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4(2)'s "public offering" definition to section 3(c)(1) flows naturally
considering that the limited liability company or limited partnership
interests offered in most hedge funds are generally considered "securities"
under the 1933 Act."8
Most hedge funds typically comply with section 4(2) through the safe
harbor provisions of Regulation D's Rule 506.69 Rule 506 is the preferred
private offering method for two primary reasons. First, as opposed to all
other private offering exemptions under Regulation D, a Rule 506 offering
has no limitation on the aggregated dollar amount raised in an offering.7"
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, securities offered in a Rule 506
offering are the only securities under Regulation D that meet the definition
of "covered securities" under section 18, which preempts any substantive
state regulation of covered securities (beyond anti-fraud regulation).7
While 3(c)(1) specifies no income or asset requirements for investors to
invest in a 3(c)(1) fund, such investors are nevertheless generally required
to be "accredited investors" for purposes of complying with Rule 506.72
Under Rule 506, offers can be made to an unlimited number of "accredited

section 5 under the 1933 Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 77f] any "transactions by an issuer not involving a
public offering."
68. See generally SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (stating that an
investment contract is a transaction involving "an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others"). Cf also 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(a)(1).
69. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supranote 17, at 14. Rule 506 under Regulation D of the
1933 Act is codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. 230.506 [hereinafter Rule 506]. Compliance with
Rule 506 is not an exclusive means of demonstrating compliance with 15 U.S.C.S. § 77d(2); it is
only a safe harbor. Id.
70. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (exempting "limited offerings and sales of securities not
exceeding $1,000,000") and 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (exempting "limited offers and sales of securities
not exceeding $5,000,000"), with Rule 506 (exempting "limited offers and sales without regard to
dollar amount of offering").
71. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77r(aXIXA), (bX4)(D); see also Securities Lawyer's Deskbook,
Regulation D-Preliminary Notes, availableat http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/regDNote.
html (last visited Dec. 22,2005); cf.Jill E. Fisch, Can InternetOfferings Bridge the SmallBusiness
CapitalBarrier?,2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57,69 (1998). Rule 506 is the only exemption
under Regulation D that is exempted pursuant to section 4(2) under the 1933 Act. See Rule 506(a).
Rules 504 and 505 are exempted from the 1933 Act's registration requirement pursuant to section
3(b). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(a). Section 18 includes exempt offerings
pursuant to rules issued under 4(2) within the definition of a "covered security"; no provision is
made for section 3(b) exempt offerings. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77r(aX1XA), (bX4).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) defines an accredited investor as, subject to certain limitations,
any natural person with a net worth exceeding $1,000,000; any natural person with income
exceeding $200,000 (or $300,000jointly); any employee benefit plan; any corporation, partnership,
trust or non profit company with assets exceeding $5,000,000; banks; S&Ls; insurance companies;
broke or dealers, inter alia.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

15

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7

374

4FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF INTERINATIONAL LAW

[V€OL
18

investors" and no more than 35 "purchasers."" Rule 506 hedge fund
offerings, inter alia, are subject to resale restrictions, limitations on general
advertising and solicitation, and limited filing requirements and fees.74
B. Section 3(c)(7)
Section 3(c)(7) is the second primary hedge fund exemption under the
1940 Act. Section 3(c)(7) exempts from the definition of "investment
company" any issuer whose outstanding securities "are owned exclusively
by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified
purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to
make a public offering of such securities." Accordingly, an issuer must
comply with two requirements in order to satisfy section 3(c)(7). First, the
issuer must restrict its security holders to "qualified purchasers." Second,
the issuer must not make a public offering of its interests. This exemption
reflects the congressional view that certain highly sophisticated investors
do not need the 1940 Act's protection since their sophistication and
investment experience already put them in a position to evaluate the risks
of pooled investment vehicles." Since the public offering implications for
a 3(c)(7) fund are identical to those previously discussed for a 3(c)(1)
fund, the following section will only address issues pertaining to section
3(c)(7)'s qualified purchaser requirement.
1. Qualified Purchasers
According to section 3(c)(7)'s literal language, a 3(c)(7) fund can have
an unlimited number of qualified purchasers; it is not limited to the 100
investor test.76 However, section 12(g) and Rule 12g- 1 under the 1934 Act
require issuers with 500 holders of record and assets over $10 million to
register under the 1934 Act.77 Since most hedge funds desire to avoid
registration under the 1934 Act, the number of investors in a 3(c)(7) fund
is, in practice, limited to 499 qualified purchasers.78

73. All investors other than "accredited investors" are considered purchasers. Cf. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.50 l(e). Under Rule 506(bX2)(ii), the 35 purchasers must, "either alone or with his purchaser
representative(s), have such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is

capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably
believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description."
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)-(d); 17 C.F.R. § 230.503.
75. See NSMIA, S. REP. No. 104-290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1996).
76. See generally § 3(c)(7).
77. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
78. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 18-19.
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Qualified purchasers, which are defined under section 2(a)(5 1) of the
1940 Act, include:"
I. Natural Persons who own at least $5 million in investments (as defined
in Rule 2a5 I-1);' 0
2. Certain family owned companies that own at least $5 million in
investments;
3. Certain trusts that are not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring
the securities offered, as to which the trustee or other person authorized
to make decisions with respect to the trust, and each settlor or other
person who has contributed assets to the trust is a qualified purchaser;
4. Entities that, in the aggregate own and invest on a discretionary basis,
not less than $25 million in investments; and
5. Qualified Institutional Buyers under rule 144A, subject to certain
limitations."'
2. Section 3(c)(7) Integration and Knowledgeable Employees
Since no numerical limitations are imposed upon 3(c)(7) funds under
the 1940 Act, the look-through provisions associated with section 3(c)(1),
which are designed to prevent circumventing the 100 beneficial owner
limitation, generally do not apply to 3(c)(7) funds. However, investing

79. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(aXSIXAXi)-(iv).
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-I(b) [hereinafter Rule 2a51-l].
81. See Rule 2a51-1(g); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 [hereinafter Rule 144A] (defining
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) "as certain institutions (including registered investment
companies) that own and invest on a discretionary basis $100 million of securities of issuers that
are not affiliated with the institution...; banks that own and invest on a discretionary basis $100
million of QIB Securities and that have an audited net worth of at least $25 million; and certain
registered dealers"). See alsoPrivately Offered Investment Companies, SEC Release No. IC-22597,
Part II.A.I (Apr. 3, 1997) (noting that the Commission believes it to be appropriate to treat QIBs
as qualified purchasers given the high threshold of securities ownership that such institutions must
meet under Rule 144A, which is markedly higher than the investment ownership threshold for
qualified purchasers under section 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(aX51XA)). Accordingly, Rule 2a51-1
"provides that, with two exceptions, a QIB is deemed to be a qualified purchaser." Id. The first
exception relates to dealers, which, under Rule 144A, must "own and invest on a discretionary basis
$10 million of QIB Securities." Id. To coincide with the definition of qualified purchaser, Rule
2a51-1 "requires the dealer to own and invest on a discretionary basis $25 million of QIB
Securities."Id. The second exception excludes from the definition of qualified purchaser employee
benefit plans, which are defined as QIBs under Rule 144A. Id. However, an employee could invest
in a 3(c)(7) fund through a self-directed plan if the employee is a qualified purchaser. Id.
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entities formed for the specific purpose of investing' in a section 3(c)(7)
fund or investing entities allowing their beneficial owners to opt in or out
of investments (e.g., certain defined employee contribution plans) should
be "looked through."8 3 If "looked through," each of the investing entities'
beneficial owners must be qualified purchasers."
Additionally, in light of the different policy considerations underlying
sections 3(c)(7) and 3(c)(1)," the SEC will not integrate a sponsor's
3(c)(7) fund with its 3(c)(1) counterpart.8 6 Accordingly, a sponsor may
form two parallel funds with identical investment objectives-one fund
may be formed solely for qualified purchasers pursuant to section 3(c)(7)
and another fund may be formed solely for 100 beneficial owners pursuant
to 3(c)(1). 8 '
Like 3(c)(1) funds, certain Knowledgeable Employees and affiliates of
3(c)(7) funds are permitted to own interests therein. 8 The exemption
permits investments by such Knowledgeable Employees in a 3(c)(7) fund
even if they are not qualified purchasers.89
C. Section 12(D)(1)"s Application to Hedge Funds
In its 1966 Report, the SEC expressed a renewed concern over
investment companies owning the shares of other investment companies
(Fund Holding Companies)."° First, the SEC renewed their concern that
Fund Holding Companies would be prone to exerting an undue influence
or control over the activities of another investment company's portfolio
through the threat of large scale redemptions; 9 secondly, the SEC was
82. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing that an entity is presumed to have been formed for the
sole purpose of investing in a private fund where 40% of the investing entity's assets are invested

in the private fund).
83. Cf.Privately Offered Investment Companies, SEC Release IC-22597, Part II.A. 1 (Apr.

3, 1997); 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2 (aX51)(AXiii).
84. SeegenerallyPrivatelyOfferedInvestment Companies, SEC ReleaseNo. IC-22597, Part
II.A.I (Apr. 3, 1997).
85. See discussion supra Part l.A.

86. See § 3(cX7)(E).
87. See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES §
3.07[l][a][i][B], 3-35, 3-36 (2004). Additionally, while it is unlikely that a qualified purchaser
owning interests in the 3(cX7) would also purchase interests in the 3(c)(1) fund, it is technically
permissible. However, under no circumstance could a non-qualified purchaser, which is a valid

beneficial owner of a 3(c)(1) fund, also invest in the 3(cX7) fund.
88. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
89. See Rule 3c-5(b); see Privately Offered Investment Companies, SEC Release No. IC22597, Part III.B (Apr. 3, 1997).
90. See generally 1966 Report, supranote 9, at 307-24.
91. Id. at 314-18.
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concerned that investors would be harmed through the pyramiding of fees
(i.e., advisory fees, administrative expenses, sales loads and brokerage
fees) that are inevitably associated with Fund Holding Companies;92
additionally, the SEC was inherently skeptical of Fund Holding
Companies as valid investment vehicles altogether (collectively, Policy
Concerns). 93 The SEC believed Fund Holding Companies provided overdiversification to the detriment of investors, duplication of security
holdings, inconsequential expertise in selecting other investment
companies, and the opportunity for Fund Holding Companies to avoid
their own investment policies (e.g., a fund, which has an anti-leveraging
policy, could invest in other funds that utilize leverage)." Although the
SEC's initial recommendation-that Fund Holding Companies be
eliminated altogether-was rejected,95 section 12(d) of the 1940 Act,
which governs Fund Holding Companies, was significantly amended in
1970 to address the Policy Concerns raised in the 1966 Report." What
ultimately resulted, was the modern day construct of section 12(d)(1).9'
Entities complying with sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) are exempted from
being deemed an investment company with respect to nearly all provisions
of the 1940 Act. 9S However, sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)(D) specify that
entities complying with its provisions shall nevertheless be considered an
"investment company" with respect to sections 12(d)(1)(A)(i) and
12(d)(1)(B)(i). 99 The policy behind applying such sections to 3(c)(1) and
3(c)(7) funds (collectively, 3(c) Funds), discussed in detail below, is to
limit the ability of 3(c) Funds to unduly influence or control registered
investment companies through the threat of large scale redemptions.
1. Section 12(d)(1)(A)
Section 12(d)(1)(A) makes it unlawful, under certain circumstances,
for:

92. Id. at 318-20.
93. Id. at 320-22.
94. Id.
95. 1966 Report, supranote 9, at 323 (stating that the "Commission therefore recommends
that section 12(dXl) of the Act be amended so as to prevent the creation and operation of fund
holding companies").
96. See generally Act of Dec. 14, 1970, "Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,"
Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
97. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-12(d) [hereinafter § 12, section 12, or 12].
98. See generally §§ 3(cXl), 3(cX7).
99. See §§ 3(cXl), 3(cX7)(D).
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any registered investment company (the "acquiring

company") and any company or companies controlled by such
acquiring company to purchase or otherwise acquire any security
issued by any other investment company (the "acquired company")
and...
[2] ... for any investment company (the "acquiring company") and

any company or companies controlled by such acquiring company
to purchase or otherwise acquire any security issued by any
registered investment company (the "acquired company"), if....'0
Section 12(d)(1)(A) essentially deals with two "acquiring" transactions. In
the first transaction above, a registered investment company (and any
company it controls) is acquiring securities issued by another investment
company, whether registered or unregistered (First Transaction).'°' In the
second transaction above, an investment company (registered or
unregistered), and any company that it controls, is acquiring securities
issuedby a registeredinvestment company (Second Transaction). Section

12(d)(1)(A) makes both transactions unlawful IF the acquiring company,
and any company or companies controlled by it, has violated ANY one of
the following three restrictions after such transactions are completed:
(i) The acquiring company may not own more than 3% of the
acquired company's stock; °
(ii) The acquiring company's assets may not be comprised of more
than 5%of the acquired company's stock;'0 3 or
(iii) The acquiring company's assets may not be comprised of more
than 10% of investment company stock (this includes stock of all
investment
companies in addition to the acquired company's
°4
stock).1

100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(d)(lXA)-(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
101. See § 12(d)(IXA); see also §§ 3(cXl), 3(cX7) (stating that while such unregistered

entities are exempted from the definition of investment company, they are, however, "investment
companies" for purposes of§ 12(d)(IXA) and § 12(dXl)(B)).
102. See § 12(d)(1XAXi).
103. See § 12(d)(1)(AXii).
104. See § 12(dX1XA)(iii).
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In order to understand the correct application of section 12(d)(1)(A),
it cannot be read alone; it must be read in conjunction with sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7)(D). Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)(D) specify that entities
complying with its provisions (i.e., 3(c) Funds) shall nevertheless be
considered an "investment company" under the portion of section
12(d)(1)(A)(i) that governs an "investment company" purchasing "any
security issued by any registeredinvestment company."'0 5 Accordingly,

3(c) Funds are considered to be an "investment company" only for
purposes of 12(d)(1)(A)'s Second Transaction, which governs an
"investment company" purchasing "any security issued by any registered

investment company"; 3(c) Funds are not considered to be an "investment
company" for purposes of 12(d)(1)(A)'s First Transaction, which governs
any "registered investment company" purchasing "any security issued by
any investment company."' ° Furthermore, 3(c) Funds are not only
considered to be an "investment company" under the Second Transaction,
but even then only with respect to the 3%test in 12(d)(l)(A)(i); the 5%
and 10% tests in 12(d)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii), respectively, do not apply to 3(c)
Funds regardless of whether or not a First or Second Transaction is
involved." The following paragraphs break down some of the dizzying
array of transactions possible under section 12(d)(1)(A) with respect to
3(c) Funds.

105. See §§ 3(cXl), 3(cX7XD) (emphasis added).
106. Cf id. In 1992, the SEC believed that investments by registered investment companies
into 3(c) Funds should not be constrained by section 12(d)(l). The SEC felt that anti-pyramiding
concerns would be minimized by other provisions of the 1940 Act that govern registered funds
(e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-17). Accordingly, the SEC recommended an amendment to section 3(c)(1)
to remove application of 12(dXl) in connection with investments by registered investment
companies, but to require that 3(c) Funds be subject to 12(dXl)(A)'s restrictions governing the
purchase of interests in registered investment companies. See PROTECTING INVESTORS, supranote
14, at 108-09 (emphasis added). As a result, in 1996, 3(c)(1) was amended under NSMIA to reflect
this recommendation by the insertion of the following language into 3(cX 1):
Such issuer shall be deemed to be an investment company for purposes of the
limitations set forth in subparagraphs (AXi) and (B)(i) of section 12(d)(1)
governing the purchase or other acquisition by such issuer of any security issued
by any registered investment company and the sale of any security issued by any
registered open-end investment company to any such issuer.
See NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, at 209 (1996).
107. Cf.Id. § 3(cXl); § 3(cX7)(D).
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a. 3(c) Funds Acquiring Interests in Investment Companies
With respect to 3(c) Funds acquiring interests in registeredinvestment
companies, 3(c) Funds may not purchase more than 3% of any single
registered investment company's outstanding voting stock.' However,
3(c) Funds may have more than 5% of their assets invested in a single
registered investment company and may have more than 10% of their
assets invested in all registered investment companies."9
With respect to 3(c) Funds acquiring interests in other unregistered
investment companies l l (e.g., other 3(c) Funds), the 3%, 5%, and 10%
limitations under section 12(d)(1)(A) are not applicable since such
transactions do not fall within the scope of any transaction regulated under
section 12(d)(l)(A)."' Many private fund sponsors take advantage of this
loophole and form hedge "funds of funds" that invest solely in other hedge
funds without any 12(d)(1) limitations." 2 However, 3(c)(1) funds will
nevertheless limit investments by other investment companies, including
hedge funds of funds, to no more than 10% of their outstanding voting
securities in order to avoid the look-through provisions of section
3(c)(1)(A) for purposes of counting their 100 beneficial owners." 3 As a
result, a hedge fund of funds will typically invest in 15 to 25 funds to
avoid overexposing its investors to any single underlying hedge fund
adviser and endangering the fund's exemption under the look-through test
in section 3(c)(1)(A)."'
It is noteworthy, however, that, despite the SEC's Policy Concerns
regarding Fund Holding Companies,"15 hedge funds of fimds are becoming
increasingly popular. Studies show that in the first three quarters of 2002

108. Cf. 1d.; § 12(d)(1XAXi). Such a transaction is limited because it is a Second Transaction
within the scope of the 12(d)(IXAXi) 3% limitation test.
109. Cf. §§ 3(cX1), 3(cX7XD), & 12(d)(1)(A)(i). Although such transactions are Second

Transactions under 12(d)(l XA), they are, nevertheless, outside the scope of the 3% limitation, and,
as such, outside the scope of limitations set forth in §§ 3(cXl) & 3(c)(7)(D).
110. See discussion infra Part II.C.3 (discussing those entities qualifying as unregistered
investment companies).
111. Cf. §§ 3(c)(1), 3(cX7)(D), & 12(dXIXAXi). Since no registered investment company is
involved, such a transaction is outside of the scope of 12(dX 1XA)'s First or Second Transaction.
See also supra text accompanying note 106.
112. Hedge funds of funds may also make limited investments as well in registered investment

companies subject to 12(d)(lXA)'s 3% limitation. See generally SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra
note 17, at 67-68.
113. See PROTECTMG INVESTORS, supranote 14, at 109 n.21. See also discussion supra Part

H.A.2.
114. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supranote 17, at 67.
115. See generally 1966 Report, supra note 9, at 307-24.
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alone, such funds grew both in number and assets; 32% and 84%,
respectively.1 6 The increase in popularity of such funds may partly be
attributed to their diversification, lower minimum investment
requirements, and access to limited slots in the underlying hedge funds
invested in. Although, it should be noted that the SEC's Policy Concerns
regarding Fund Holding Companies are less problematic in hedge funds

of funds arrangements since the limited partners therein typically cannot
take advantage of daily redemptions.
b. Registered Investment Companies Acquiring Interests in Certain
Other Investment Companies
With respect to registered investment companies acquiring interests in
3(c) Funds, registered investment companies may (i) purchase more than
3% of a 3(c) Fund's outstanding voting stock, (ii) have more than 5%of
their assets invested in a single 3(c) Fund, and (iii) have more than 10% of
their assets invested in all 3(c) Funds.1 7 However, while these transactions
are "permissible" under section 12(d)(1)(A), they are not practical in light
of other provisions within the 1940 Act. First, if a registered investment
company acquires more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of
a single 3(c)(1) Fund, then the registered investment company's
shareholders will be considered beneficial owners of the 3(c)(1) Fund."'
As a result, 3(c)(1) Funds will generally not permit any single investment
company (registered or unregistered) to acquire more than 10% of its
outstanding voting securities in order to avoid the application of
3(c)(1)(A)'s beneficial owner look-through provision. 1 9 Secondly, if the
registered investment company is a diversified management company
under the 1940 Act, then it must have at least 75% of its assets invested in
"cash and cash items (including receivables), Government securities,
20 A
,,1
securities of other investment companies, and other securities ....
diversified management company's assets may not be counted toward its
75% test if either: (1) the securities of any single issuer comprise more

116. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 68.
under 12(dX1XA)'s First
117. These transactions are permissible since such transactions fadl
Transaction, which governs a "registered investment company" acquiring interests in securities
"issued by investment companies"; the First Transaction does not include 3(c) Funds since 3(c)
Funds are only considered to be an investment company for purposes of an "investment company"
acquiring securities "issued by a registered investment company" (i.e., a 12(dXl) Secondary
Transaction). Cf.§§ 3(c)(1), 3(cX7)(D), & 12(dXIXA).
118. See discussion supra Part H.A.2.
119. Id. See also PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 14, at 109 n.21.
120. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-5(bXl).
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than 5% of the diversified company's assets or; (2) the diversified
management company owns more than 10% of a single issuer's voting
securities. 2' Accordingly, registered diversified management companies
are practically limited to holding no more than 5% of their assets in a
single issuer or acquiring more than 10% of a single issuer's voting
securities, whichever is less.
With respect to registered investment companies acquiring interests in
other registered investment companies, 12(d)(1)(A)'s 3%, 5% and 10%
tests are all applicable. 2 Therefore, a registered investment company may
not (i) purchase more than 3% of the total outstanding voting stock of
another registered investment company, (ii) have more than 5% of its
assets invested in any single registered investment company, and (iii) have
more than 10%
of its assets invested in all registered investment
3
companies.1

The hedge fund of funds phenomenon has not been limited only to
hedge fund of funds offered as 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) funds; such funds are
beginning to register with the SEC. As of December 10, 2004, 52 hedge
funds of funds have registered with the SEC and offer or plan to offer their
shares publicly. 24 Such funds may operate as registered investment
companies if they, inter alia, sufficiently diversify their holdings in funds
with respect to the limitations that 12(d)(l)(A) and (B) imputes upon
registered investment companies.
2. Section 12(d)(1)(B)
Section 12(d)(1)(B) makes it unlawful, under certain circumstances,
for:
[A]ny registered open-end investment company (the "acquired
company"), any principal underwriter therefor, or any broker or
dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
knowingly to sell or otherwise dispose of any security issued by the
acquired company to any other investment company (the "acquiring

121. Id.
122. Cf 12(d)(1XA)(i)-(iii). Such transactions are entirely governed by 12(d)(1)(A)'s Second
Transaction and are fully subject, without exception, to the percentage limitations in 12(d)(1 XAXi)(iii).
123. Id.
124. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054, at 72057 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. 275.203(b)(3)-1).
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company") or any company or companies controlled by the
acquiring company, if....
Section 12(d)(1)(B) deals with one principal transaction; the ability of a
registered open-end investment company to "sell" or "dispose" of its
securities to another investment company (whether registered or
unregistered) (Only Transaction). Under 12(d)(1)(B), a registered openend investment company (the "acquired company") may not sell its
securities to another registered or unregistered investment company (the
"acquiring company") if, after such transaction, any one of the following
two restrictions is violated:
(i) The acquiring company may not own more than 3% of the
registered open-end investment company's stock; or
(ii) All investment companies (including the acquiring company),
than 10%
whether registered or unregistered, may NOT own more
25
of a registered open-end investment company's stock.
Since 3(c) Funds are considered to be investment companies for purposes
of section 12(d)(l)(B)(i)'s 3% restriction, a registered open-end
investment company may not sell more than 3% of its stock to any single
3(c) Fund.1 26
The 3% restriction under 12(d)(l)(B)(i) above is markedly similar to
the 3% restriction in 12(d)(l)(A)(i). The primary difference is that the
restriction in 12(d)(1)(B)(i) is now placed upon the seller (the acquired
company) versus the purchaser (the acquiring company). However, the
10% seller restriction in 12(d)(1)(B)(ii) is markedly different,
substantively, than the 10% purchaser restriction in 12(d)(l)(A)(iii).
Section 12(d)(1)(A)(iii) only restricts a SINGLE investment company
(other than 3(c) Funds) from having more than 10% of its portfolio
invested in investment companies. Section 12(d)(l)(B)(ii), on the other

125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12(dXl)(BXi)-(ii).
126. See § 3(c)(1); § 3(cX7)(D).
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hand, restricts an open-end registered investment company from selling
more than 10% of its securities to ALL investment companies.' 27
3. The Extraterritorial Application of 12(d)(1)
As previously stated, the First Transaction in 12(d)(1)(A) applies to
registered investment companies acquiring interests in investment
companies (whether registered or unregistered) and the Second
Transaction in 12(d)(l)(A) applies to investment companies (whether
registered or unregistered) acquiring interests in registered investment
companies. The Only Transaction in section 12(d)(1)(B) applies to
registered open-end investment companies selling interests therein to
investment companies (registered or unregistered), and 3(c) Funds are
considered to be investment companies only for purposes of the Second
Transaction under 12(d)(1)(A) and, furthermore, only with respect to the
3% tests under 12(d)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i). 28 Two questions necessarily
arise in light of these applications: (1) if 3(c) Funds are not considered to
be "unregistered investment companies" under the First Transaction of
12(d)(1)(A), then what entities are considered to be unregistered
investment companies thereunder; and (2) what entities other than 3(c)
Funds, if any, qualify as an unregistered investment company under
12(d)(1)(A)'s Second Transaction and 12(d)(l)(B)'s Only Transaction?
Determining what "unregistered investment companies" are, will
instinctively resolve these questions.
Generally, there are three possible entities that may be defined as
unregistered investment companies. First, 3(c) Funds are unregistered
"investment companies."' 29 Although technically, 3(c) Funds are merely
exempted from the definition of an "investment company."13 ° Second,
entities that should have registered, but have not (Prohibited Funds), are
considered unregistered investment companies.' 3' Prohibited Funds
127. While 3(c) Funds technically are not considered to be investment companies under
12(d)(1)(B)(ii), it is unlikely that registered investment companies would sell more than 10% of
their outstanding voting stock to all 3(c) Funds in view of their inability to sell more than 10% of
their outstanding voting stock to all registered investment companies. Since this is a technical
loophole, most registered open-end funds are advised to comply with 12(d)(1)(BXii)'s 10%
restriction on sales to all investment companies, including 3(c) Funds.
128. See discussion supra Parts H.C.I & lI.C.2.
129. Since 3(c) exempts 3(c) Funds from the definition of investment company, they elude the
1940 Act requirement for a domestic "investment company" to register under 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-8.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-7(a).
130. See generally discussion supra Parts ll.A & ll.B.
131. See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 22.01[F][2] (2d ed.

2001).
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include, for example: (1) funds that previously qualified as 3(c) Funds, but
no longer qualify as a result of violating the 100 beneficial owner test or
other offering restrictions; or (2) offshore investment companies
established under foreign laws that engage in non-exempt U.S. offerings
but have not obtained SEC permission to register pursuant to section 7(d)
of the 1940 Act.'32 Third, investment companies organized under foreign
laws that have not engaged in any activity giving rise to U.S. jurisdiction
(Foreign Funds) may be considered unregistered investment companies.'33
An interesting issue arises, however, when considering the inclusion of
Foreign Funds into the definition of an unregistered investment company
for purposes of section 12(d)(1)(A). 134 As previously discussed, only 3(c)
Funds are not included in the definition of an investment company for
35
purposes of 12(d)(1)(A)'s 5%test (5%Test) and 10% test (10% Test).
As a result, the 5%and 10% Tests may apply to Foreign Funds if Foreign
Funds are not considered to be 3(c) Funds.
If a Foreign Fund is not considered a 3(c) Fund, the 5%and 10% Tests
would not be triggered with respect to a Foreign Fund until it purchases
interests in a registered investment company.' 3 In other words, Foreign
Funds, like all investment companies, would not be subject to 12(d)(1 )(A)
132. Cf.id. See also 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-7(a).
133. See FRANKEL, supra note 131.

134. This issue is, for the most part, only applicable to 12(dXXA) since 12(dX1XB) only
regulates the selling activities of registered open-end investment companies; no selling restrictions
are placed upon Foreign Funds. Foreign Funds are only relevant to 12(dX 1)(B) to the extent that
registered open-end investment companies must limit the percentage amount ofsecurities they issue
to, inter alia, Foreign Funds. Compare generally § 12(d)(1)(A), with § 12(d)(1)(B).
135. See discussion supra Parts II.C.1 & II.C.2. Cf.§ 3(c)(1); § 3(cX7)(D).
136. A Foreign Fund can only trigger the 3%, 5%, and 10% tests in 12(d)(1)(A) bypurchasing
a security issued by a registered investment company (i.e., a Second Transaction); in other words,
this is the only means that a Foreign Fund may qualify as an acquiring company under 12(dX1XA).
While a Foreign Fund is considered to be an investment company for purposes of the First
Transaction, only a registered investment company can trigger a First Transaction vs-6-vis
purchasing interests in, for example, a Foreign Fund (here, the Foreign Fund would only be
considered an "acquired company"). When a registered investment company triggers a First
Transaction, the tests are only applied "immediately after such purchase" and only with respect to
the actions or assets of the triggering or acquiring entity. So, for example, it would be unlawful for
a registered investment company (the acquiring company) to purchase more than 3% of the
outstanding voting stock of a Foreign Fund (the acquired company), but it would not be unlawful
for a Foreign Fund to sell more than 3%of its stock to a registered investment company since
12(d)(1)(B) only limits the selling activities of a registered open-end investment company.
Accordingly, should Foreign Funds not be considered 3(c) Funds, Foreign Funds may avoid the
extraterritorial application of 12(d)(l) by not purchasing (i.e., becoming an acquiring company)
stock in a registered investment company, in other words, by not making a Secondary Transaction.
See generally § 12(dXl).
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until they become "acquiring companies.' 3 7 Therefore, Foreign Funds will
be fully subject to the 5% and 10% Tests ifthey: (1) are not interpreted as
3(c) Funds; and (2) make even minimal investments 3 in a registered
investment company. 39 If such an extraterritorial interpretation were
taken, such Foreign Funds could have no more than 5% of their assets
invested into any single registered investment company, and no more than
10% of their assets could be invested in all registered investment
companies AND allforeign funds. " This interpretation is particularly
harsh since the assets of 3(c) Funds, which, unlike Foreign Funds, actually
contain U.S. beneficial ownership, are able to be 100% invested in
registered investment companies and Foreign Funds. 4 ' Not affording. the
same accommodation to Foreign Funds (i.e., not considering Foreign
Funds to be 3(c) Funds) would violate international financial regulatory
comity.

137. See generally § 12(d)(1XA) (stating that the percentage limitations of 12(d)(1)(A) only
apply to an "acquiring company... immediately after such purchase").
138. In this context, making a limited investment would mean acquiring no more than 3% of
the outstanding voting stock of any single registered investment company.
139. Such a Foreign Fund would be subject to all of 12(dXl)'s limitations since it would be
considered an acquiring company for purposes of 12(dXl)(A)'s Second Transaction.
140. Cf § 12(dXl XAXii), (iii). But for the words "and all other investment companies" being
included within the 10% test as set forth in 12(dXIXAXiii), such 10% test would only limit a
Foreign Fund that has purchased interests in a registered investment company from having 10% of
its portfolio invested in registered investment companies. As currently drafted though,
12(dXl)(AXiii) limits a Foreign Fund, which has purchased interests in a registered investment
company (thereby triggering a Second Transaction), from having more than 10% of its portfolio
invested in registered and unregistered investment companies (excluding 3(c) Funds). See also
discussion supra note 136 and accompanying text.
141. 3(c) Funds are only considered to be investment companies for purposes of 12(dX1)(A)
and (B)'s 3% tests. See §§ 3(cXl), 3(c)(7).
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However, interpreting Foreign Funds as 3(c) Funds, 142 and similarly
applying 12(d)(1)'s limitations thereto, would respect international
financial regulatory comity without compromising the core policies
underlying 12(d)(1). 43 For example, such an interpretation would still
preclude a Foreign Fund from acquiring more than 3% of the outstanding
voting stock of a registered investment company and, as a result, unduly
influencing it.'" At the same time, like 3(c) Funds, Foreign Funds could
allow more than 10% of their portfolios to be invested in other Foreign
Funds and registered investment companies.' 45

142. While there is little formal guidance on where the SEC stands regarding this
interpretation, some support does exist fvoring this interpretation. The SEC has indicated that
issuers:
[O]rganized in a country other than the United States may make a private
placement in the U.S.... concurrently with an offering in another country in
accordance with [Riegulation S under the... [1933 Act] ... without integrating
the two offerings for purposes of determining whether the issuer complies with
section 3(c)(1) or 3(cX7) or has made a public offering in contravention of section
7(d) of the... [ 1940 Act].
See RegistrationUndertheAdvisers Act ofCertainHedge FundAdvisers,Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054 n.226 (Dec. 10, 2004); see also Goodwin, Proctor, & Hoar,
SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 5, 1998) (stating that section 7(d) of the Act does not prohibit a
Foreign Fund that is conducting a private U.S. offering from using U.S. jurisdictional means in
connection with a concurrent offshore public offering, provided that the fund counts or qualifies
all U.S. person shareholders for purposes of sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Act, respectively).
Regulation S is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-230.904 (2006). If the 5% and 10% Tests ever
became an issue for a Foreign Fund, such Foreign Fund could argue that it qualifies as a 3(c) Fund
assuming that such Foreign Fund (1) has less than 100 beneficial owners (which would only include
U.S. residents for funds organized offshore); (2) has not made a public offering in the United States;
and (3) has complied with Regulation S in its offshore offerings.
143. Cf.generallydiscussionsupraPart II.C (setting forth the SEC's concerns regarding Fund
Holding Companies).
144. Compare discussion supraPart II.C, with 12(d)(1)(A)(i), (BXii). Likewise, a registered
investment company could not purchase more than 3% of the outstanding voting stock of a Foreign
Fund, thereby eliminating the ability of a U.S. registered investment company to unduly influence
a Foreign Fund.
145. While there are no negative U.S. implications of Foreign Funds having more than 10%
of their assets invested into other Foreign Funds, policy concerns may exist if a Foreign Fund has
more than 10% of its assets invested into a registered investment company. However, the risk of
a Foreign Fund being more inclined to unduly influence a registered investment company based
upon the percentage of such Foreign Fund's assets invested therein is no more of such a risk
occurring in 3(c) Funds, which are permitted to have more than 10% of their assets invested in a
registered investment company. Comparegenerally §§ 3(cXl), 3(c)(7)(D), with § 12(d)(1)(A)(iii).
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While the SEC is naturally concerned about the negative implications
of Fund Holding Companies, the SEC should permit the home
jurisdictions of Foreign Funds to have exclusive jurisdiction over
determining what percentage of a Foreign Fund's assets may be invested
in other investment companies. Interpreting Foreign Funds as 3(c) Funds
would defer such discretion to foreign regulators and, at the same time,
prevent Foreign Funds from acquiring enough interests in a registered
investment company (i.e., more than 3%of its outstanding voting stock)
to exert any undue influence thereon.

III. ERISA CONSIDERATIONS
A. GeneralBackground

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974' imputes
certain fiduciary duties (ERISA Fiduciary Duties) upon persons (ERISA
Fiduciary) that advise, for a fee, or exercise discretionary authority or
control (collectively, Discretion) over certain employee benefit plans
(ERISA Plans).' 47 An ERISA Fiduciary must act under a prudent standard
of care, diversify investments sufficiently to avoid the risk of large losses,
and, inter alia, refrain from a number of prohibited transactions between
ERISA Plans, parties in interest, and ERISA Fiduciaries."41 Additionally,
ERISA Fiduciaries may be subject to liability as a result of breaches by cofiduciaries under certain circumstances. 49 While registered investment
146. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended primarily in 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2005)) [hereinafter ERISA].
147. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(21)(A); see generally 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21. The term
"employee benefit plan," as used herein, is intended to have the same definition as such phrase has
under ERISA, which includes "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit
plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit
plan." See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(3).
148. See 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1104(a) and 1106(a)-(b).
149. In addition to the liability an ERISA Fiduciary may sustain for failure to comply with his
own fiduciary responsibilities, he may, additionally, be subject to liability for breaches by cofiduciaries (1) when he:
participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission
of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach; (2) if, by his
failure to comply with [his own fiduciary responsibilities], he has enabled such
other fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such
other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to
remedy the breach.
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companies are specifically exempted from being deemed ERISA
Fiduciaries, hedge funds are not exempted in light of their unregistered
status under the 1940 Act.'50 Accordingly, in order to avoid ERISA
Fiduciary Duties, hedge funds have traditionally limited the interests that
of their equity securities to avoid being
ERISA Plans acquire in any class
5
deemed ERISA Fiduciaries.' '
B. PlanAssets
In order to understand how hedge fund advisers avoid ERISA Fiduciary
Duties, while still allowing limited ERISA Plan investments into their
funds, a discussion of ERISA's statutory and regulatory scheme is
necessary. Hedge fund advisers become subject to ERISA Fiduciary
Duties when they exercise Discretion over an ERISA Plan's assets (Plan
Assets).152 Accordingly, determining whether hedge fund advisers have
Plan Assets under their Discretion is pivotal in determining whether
ERISA's Fiduciary Duties apply to hedge fund advisers.
As a general rule, an entity that receives an investment from a plan
(Invested Entity) will not be deemed to have Plan Assets. 53 After such
investments are made, Plan Assets will be deemed only to include the
plan's resulting equity or related interest in the Invested Entity."5 So, for
example, since only an initial ERISA Fiduciary (who first exercised
Discretion to invest the ERISA Plan in the Invested Entity (ERISA
Trustee)) will be able to exercise Discretion over the resulting equity
interest, he alone will be deemed to have ERISA Fiduciary Duties

29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(a).
150. Cf.generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(2 1)(B) (stating that any money or other property of an
ERISA Plan invested in securities issued by an investment company registered under the 1940 Act
shall not cause such investment company or its investment adviser and principal underwriter to be
deemed a fiduciary). Since 3(c) exempts 3(c) Funds from the definition of investment company,
they elude the 1940 Act requirement for a domestic "investment company" to register under 15
U.S.C.S. § 80a-8. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-7(a).
151. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 28; see also discussion infra Part HI.B.
152. Cf 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(21)(A); see also flush language following 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3101(a); supra text accompanying note 146. All references to one exercising Discretion over Plan
Assets (assuming, as discussed more fully infra, at least some portion of such Plan Assets contain
Plan Assets subject to ERISA) shall imply, hereinafter, that such person has ERISA Fiduciary
Duties.
153. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2).
154. See id. For example, if an ERISA Fiduciary invests 3% of his ERISA Plan's Assets into
General Motors' (GM) stock, the GM stock is considered to be a Plan Asset; however, the
underlying assets of GM are not considered to be Plan Assets. But see infratext accompanying note
159.
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thereafter.'55 However, under ERISA's attribution provision, 15 6 when a
plan acquires the securities of an Invested Entity that is not publicly
offered 5 ' nor registered under the 1940 Act,'58 Plan Assets will be deemed
to also include an undivided interest in each of the underlying assets of the
Invested Entity.'5 9 As a result, persons exercising Discretion over such
Invested Entity's underlying assets (e.g., hedge fund advisers), which are
now considered to be Plan Assets under ERISA's attribution provision,
will, under certain circumstances, also be imputed ERISA's Fiduciary
Duties.'6°
There are, however, two exceptions to ERISA's attribution provision
whereby ERISA Plans may acquire the securities of Invested Entities,
which are not publicly offered or registered under the 1940 Act, without
causing the underlying assets of such Invested Entities to become Plan
Assets. 6 ' First, ERISA's attribution provision will not apply to Invested
Entities that are "operating companies."' 2 Operating companies include
Invested Entities that are either: (1) primarily engaged in the production
or sale of products or services-other than the investment of capital; and
(2) venture capital operating companies.'63
Traditional venture capital funds that are Invested Entities may
generally rely entirely on this exemption in order to avoid being deemed

155. Cf.id; 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(21)(AXi).
156. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2) (stating ERISA's attribution provision).
ERISA's attribution provision determines what constitute Plan Assets with respect to an ERISA
Plan's investment in another entity. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(1).
157. A security is "publicly offered" if it is "fieely transferable, part of a class of securities that
is widely held" and registered under the 1934 Act. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(b)(2). Accordingly,
ERISA Plans can make unlimited investments in publicly offered securities without causing the
underlying assets of such publicly offered securities to become Plan Assets. Cf.id.
158. Accordingly, ERISA Plans can make unlimited investments in registered mutual funds
without causing the underlying assets of such registered mutual funds to become Plan Assets. Cf.
id.Regardless of ERISA exemptions, registered mutual funds will nevertheless be subject to
prohibitions under the 1940 Act that are markedly similar to ERISA's fiduciary prohibitions.
Compare 15 U.S.C.S. §80a-1 7 (prohibiting investment company transactions with certain affiliated
persons and underwriters), with 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1106(a)-(b) (prohibiting certain transactions
between ERISA Plans, ERISA Fiduciaries, and parties in interest).
159. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(aX2). For example, ifan ERISA Plan Fiduciary invests 30%
of the ERISA Plan into the equity interests of a hedge fund, both the equity interest in the hedge
fund AND an undivided interest in the underlying assets of the hedge fund are considered to be
Plan Assets.
160. See flush language following 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-101 (aXii); see also generally discussion
infra Part III.A.
161. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(aX2)(i)-(ii).
162. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2Xi).
163. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(c).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/7

32

Crenshaw: Hedge Funds: Regulatory, Tax, and Organizational Considerations

HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORY. TAX AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

to have Plan Assets under ERISA's attribution provision.' Hedge funds,
however, must rely upon the second and less favorable exemption, 65
which provides that an Invested Entity will not be deemed to have Plan
Assets if a benefit plan's investment therein is not "significant.""' A
benefit plan's investment is considered to be "significant" if it holds, after
its most recent acquisition, 25% or more of the value of any class of equity
interests in an Invested Entity (the value of equity interests held by the
general partner and its affiliates are excluded for purposes of determining
the 25% threshold). 67
As a result; a hedge fund may avoid being deemed to have Plan Assets
under its Discretion if it allows certain benefit plans to acquire no more
than 24.99% of any class of its equity interests. Equity interests held by
non-ERISA Plans (i.e., government plans, non-U.S. plans, and non6
electing church plans) are not counted toward this 25% limitation.
However, ERISA Plans and non-ERISA Plans to which 26 U.S.C.S.
§ 4975 applies (i.e., individual retirement accounts and Keogh plans) must
be counted toward such 25% limitation.69 If a hedge fund contains
individual retirement accounts and Keogh plans in excess of the 25%
limitation, but ERISA Plans are kept out of the hedge fund, then such
hedge fund will not be deemed to have Plan Assets. As a result, once
assets from benefit plans subject to ERISA, in any amount, are invested in,
and aggregated with individual retirement account and Keogh plan assets,
then all such assets will be counted toward the 25% limitation.

164. An Invested Entity qualifies as a venture capital operating company if at least 50% of its
long term assets are invested "in an operating company (other than a venture capital operating
company) as to which it has or obtains management rights." See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(dXIXi);
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(3Xi). The term "management rights" means contractual rights directly
between the venture capital operating company and an operating company to substantially
participate in, or substantially influence the conduct of,the management of the operating company.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(dX3)(ii).
165. This exemption is less favorable to the exemptions provided for venture capital funds,
registered mutual funds, and publicly offered securities since it permits only 24.99% versus 100%
of the Invested Entity's equity interests to be held by ERISA Plans without causing the Invested
Entity's underlying assets to become Plan Assets.
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(aX2Xii).
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101()(1).

168. Cf.Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. § 61 l(f) (2006).
169. Any Investing Entity (e.g., a fund of funds) whose assets include Plan Assets by reason
of one or more plan's investment in such entity must be counted toward the 25% limitation to the
proportional extent that its assets are Plan Assets.
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C. PlanAssets in Hedge Funds
Most hedge funds opt to limit ERISA Plan investments to less than
25% of any class of their equity interests in order to avoid being deemed
to have Plan Assets under Discretion.! 0 However, some hedge fund
advisers are willing to allow Plan Assets in their funds and accept ERISA
Fiduciary Duties (ERISA Hedge Funds or ERISA Hedge Fund Advisers)
in view of the tremendous buying power of ERISA Plans. 7 ' Before an
ERISA Hedge Fund Adviser can receive Plan Assets from an ERISA
Trustee though, it must first qualify as an "investment manager" under
ERISA (an Investment Manager). 72 An Investment Manager includes any
fiduciary that "has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset
of a plan;.., is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 [and] ...has173acknowledged in writing that he is a
fiduciary with respect to the plan.'
Becoming an Investment Manager and having ERISA Fiduciary
Duties, for the most part, do not pose obstacles for hedge funds
contemplating a crossover to an ERISA Hedge Fund. '74 In fact, hedge fund
advisers registered under the Advisers Act are implicitly deemed to
possess many of the same general fiduciary duties that ERISA Fiduciaries
have.' 75 With respect to ERISA Trustees who may be reluctant to delegate
170. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supranote 17, at 28.
171. Id. Total pension and retirement plan assets were $9.4 trillion at the end of 2004. Vineeta
Anand, Pension Funds: Funds Recovering Slowly; Federal Reserve Board Data Reveal Total
Retirement Plan Assets areStill $1 TrillionBelow 1999 Levels, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar.
21, 2005, at 2.
172. "[An ERISA Trustee] shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control
the assets of the plan, except to the extent that... authority to manage, acquire, or dispose of assets
of the plan is delegated to one or more investment managers. . . ." See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1103(aX2).
See also generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 1102(c)(3) (stating that a person who is a named fiduciary with
respect to control or management of Plan Assets may appoint an investment manager to manage
any assets of a plan).
173. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(38).
174. But see infra text accompanying note 175; but see also discussion infra.
175. Cf SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (discussing
the implicit congressional recognition in the Advisers Act of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship). However, one ERISA specific fiduciary duty that may
conceivably pose an issue for certain hedge funds is the ERISA duty to diversify investments. See
29 U.S.C.S. § 1104(a)(1XC). The determination of whether or not the diversification requirement
has been satisfied is made on a case by case basis. See James Lockart, Annotation, in FIDUCIARY
DUTY TO DIVERSIFY INVESTMENTS OF BENEFIT PLAN AS REQUIRED BY § 404(a)(1)(c) OF EMPLOYEE

RETnIEMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(aX1)(c)), 155 A.L.R. Fed. 349
(2004). Diversification can be achieved by limiting the percentage of Plan Assets invested in any
single stock or class of securities, thereby protecting the hedge fund to some degree against adverse
business conditions, imprudence, or dishonesty in a particular field and minimizing the risk oflarge

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/7

34

Crenshaw: Hedge Funds: Regulatory, Tax, and Organizational Considerations

HEDGE FUNDS. REGULATORY, TAX AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERAT70NS

authority to hedge fund advisers because of co-fiduciary liability concerns,
ERISA specifically immunizes ERISA Trustees from co-fiduciary
liability 76 for breaches by Investment Managers."
One major impediment does exist, however. ERISA Hedge Fund
Advisers have a responsibility to refrain from certain prohibited
transactions (Prohibited Transactions) between ERISA Plans, parties in
interest,"7 ' and ERISA Fiduciaries (collectively, Affiliated Parties).' 79
Prohibited Transactions among Affiliated Parties include, inter alia,
selling, exchanging, or leasing any property; lending money or extending
credit; furnishing goods, services, or facilities; transferring or using any
assets of the ERISA Plan; and engaging in self dealing. 80 Such
prohibitions complicate the business arrangements of many hedge funds.
For example, since many institutions often provide financial and
operational services to ERISA Plans, thus qualifying themselves as parties
in interest with respect to such ERISA Plans, ERISA Hedge Funds and
Advisers may not generally conduct business with such underlying ERISA
Plan service providers.' 8'
The Department of Labor has provided limited relief from certain
Prohibited Transactions for an ERISA Hedge Fund that is managed by a
Qualified Portfolio Asset Manager (QPAM). is2 An ERISA Hedge Fund
Adviser generally qualifies as a QPAM if such adviser: (1) is registered
under the Advisers Act; (2) has $85,000,000 in assets under management;
and (3) has shareholders' or partners' equity in excess of $1,000,000.13 If
losses. Id. Since the diversification requirement is generally measured by considering plan
investments as a whole, ERISA Funds that are, for example, equity focused should generally be
able to satisfy the diversification requirement (assuming sufficient diversification among equities)
in light of the ERISA Plan's assets as a whole. Cf.id.
176. See supratext accompanying note 149.
177. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(d).
178. Parties in interest include any fiduciary to the ERISA Plan, any person providing services
to the ERISA Plan, and, inter alia, certain affiliated entities or persons of a fiduciary, sponsor, or
service provider of the ERISA Plan. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(14).
179. See generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 1106.
180. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1106(a)-(b).
181. Cf.supra text accompanying note 178. Such transactions would normally be considered
Prohibited Transactions. Cf.29 U.S.C.S. § 1106(aX1XC). While an ERISA Hedge Fund Adviser
could technically keep track of all the parties in interest of its ERISA Plans in order to avoid
conducting business with such parties in interest, it is simply too administratively burdensome to
do so.
182. Seegenerally Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-14, 49 Fed. Reg. 9,494, Part I (Mar.
13, 1984).
183. See Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-14 for Plan Asset
TransactionsDeterminedby Independent QualifiedProfessionalAsset Managers,70 Fed. Reg.
162, 49305, Part V(aX4Xc) (Aug. 23, 2005) (stating that "effective as of the last day of the first
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the QPAM exception is satisfied by an ERISA Hedge Fund Adviser, such
a QPAM is exempted from the requirement to not engage in certain
Prohibited Transactions under ERISA, including ERISA's prohibitions on
engaging in transactions with service providers of underlying ERISA Plan
investors.'"
However, QPAMs are not exempted from ERISA's self dealing
prohibitions," 5 which state that ERISA Fiduciaries shall not: (1) deal with
Plan Assets in its own interest or for its own account; (2) act in
transactions involving the ERISA Plan on behalf of parties with adverse
interests to the ERISA Plan; or (3) receive consideration for its own
personal account from parties dealing with such ERISA Plan with respect
to transactions involving Plan Assets.s Generally, ERISA's prohibitions
on self dealing simply create too many obstacles for the activities and
practices of hedge fund advisers, including QPAMs. 18 7 As a result, many
hedge fund advisers continue to limit ERISA Plan investments to acquiring
no more than 25% or more of any class of their funds' equity interests."' 8
IV. NEW ISSUES
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) Rule 2790
(Rule 2790) governs the manner in which "new issues" or public offerings

fiscal year of the investment adviser beginning on or after August 23, 2005, substitute
$ 85,000,000' for '$50,000,000' and I 1,000,000' for '$750,000"). "Shareholders' or partners'
equity" means the equity shown in the most recent balance sheet prepared within the two years
immediately preceding a transaction undertaken pursuant to this exemption, in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles. Id.Part V(m). As an alternative to the equity requirement,
an ERISA Hedge Fund Adviser may have all of its liabilities guaranteed. Id. Part V(aX4).
184. Affiliated Parties to an ERISA Fund, which is advised by a QPAM, are only exempted
from the Prohibited Transactions set forth in 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1106(aXl)(A)-(D).
185. Cf. id.Self dealing is prohibited pursuant to 29 U.S.C.S. § 1106(aX2); QPAMs are only
exempted from the Prohibited Transactions specified in 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1106(aX1XA)-(D).
186. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1106(b).
187. For example, certain hedge funds direct trades to brokers at times based on such brokers
having provided them with products and services helpful to its business (i.e., office space, clerical
support, marketing) as opposed to best execution and research services; such practices would
constitute self-dealing pursuant to 29 U.S.C.S. § 1106(bX1). Furthermore, performance fees,
affiliated brokerage trading, principle transactions, and, inter alia, cross-trading raise self-dealing
obstacles under ERISA as well. See LEMKE ET AL, supra note 19, at 107-09.
188. Cf. SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 28.
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are distributed by NASD members."8 9 The policy behind Rule 2790's
restrictions is to protect the integrity of public offerings by ensuring that:
(1) NASD members make bona fide public offerings of securities
at the offering price; (2) members do not withhold securities in a
public offering for their own benefit or use such securities to reward
persons who are in a position to direct future business to members;
and (3) industry insiders, including NASD members and their
associated persons, do not take advantage oftheir "insider" position
to purchase new issues for their own benefit at the expense of
public customers.'"
With this policy in mind, Rule 2790 generally prohibits NASD members,
or any person associated with such members, from selling, or causing to
be sold, 191 new issues 92 (i.e., initial public offerings or "IPOs") to any
189. See generallyNASD Rule 2790 (discussing the restrictions on the purchase and sale of
initial equity public offerings), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/
display.html?rbid=1 189&elementid=l 159000466. This one does not work]. Rule 2790 replaces
the NASD's Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation contained in IM-2 110-1, which governed

the allocation of so called "hot issues." See generally Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1 through 4 Thereto and Notice of Filing
and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 5 Thereto by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Restrictions on the Purchases and Sales ofInitial
Public Offerings of Equity Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48701, 68 Fed. Reg. 221,
62126 (Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Self Regulatory Organizations], available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groupshrulesregs/documents/rule_fling/nasdw_00059.pdf(last visited
Dec. 22, 2005).
190. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note 189, at 62126.
191. While the prohibition of Rule 2790(aX1) initially appears to only impute the duty not to
sell upon the NASD member seller, buyers of such new issues, including hedge funds, would be
liable under this clause since such buyers must first provide assurances to NASD members that they
are in compliance with Rule 2790. See generally Rule 2790(b) (describing the preconditions
necessary for the sale of any new issue). Accordingly, if a hedge fimd, for example, misrepresented
that they were in compliance with Rule 2790, they would be deemed to have caused the new issue
to be sold by the NASD member who relied thereon in making such sale. Cf.Rule 2790(aX1).
192. Pursuant to Rule 2790(iX9):
"New issue" means any initial public offering of an equity security as defined in
Section 3(aXl 1) of the (1934] Act, made pursuant to a registration statement or
offering circular. New issue shall not include:
(A) offerings made pursuant to an exemption under Section 4(1), 4(2) or 4(6) of
the Securities Act of 1933, or SEC Rule 504 if the securities are "restricted
securities" under SEC Rule 144(aX3), or Rule 144A or Rule 505 or Rule 506
adopted thereunder;
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account in which a restricted person has a beneficial interest. 93 A
restricted person includes NASD members, broker-dealers, certain
employees or owners of NASD members and broker-dealers, a hedge
fund's adviser and/or general partner, certain fiduciaries of the hedge fund,
and, as a general rule, a hedge fund's Knowledgeable Employees
(collectively, Restricted Persons).'"' As a result, without any of the
exemptions or accommodations discussed below, NASD members would
not otherwise be able to sell new issues to hedge funds that are beneficially
owned by Restricted Persons.95
While investment companies registered under the 1940 Act are entirely
exempted from Rule 2790's prohibitions on new issue distributions, hedge
funds are not.'" However, hedge funds may obtain limited relief under
(B) offerings of exempted securities as defined in Section 3(a)(12) of the Act, and
rules promulgated thereunder,
(C) offerings of securities of a commodity pool operated by a commodity pool
operator as defined under Section I a(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act;
(D) rights offerings, exchange offers, or offerings made pursuant to a merger or
acquisition;
(E) offerings of investment grade asset-backed securities;
(F) offerings of convertible securities;
(G) offerings of preferred securities;
(H) offerings of an investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940;
(I) offerings of securities (in ordinary share form or ADRs registered on Form F-6)
that have a pre-existing market outside of the United States; and
(J) offerings of a business development company as defined in Section 2(aX48)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a direct participation program as defined
in NASD Rule 28 10(a)(4), or a real estate investment trust as defined in Section
856 of the Internal Revenue Code.
193. See Rule 2790(aX 1). "'Beneficial interest' means any economic interest, such as the right
to share in gains or losses. The receipt of a management or performance based fee for operating a
collective investment account, or other fees for acting in a fiduciary capacity, shall not be
considered a beneficial interest...
." Rule 2790(iX1).
194. See Rule 2790(iX10). Note that portfolio managers are defined as "any person who has
authority to buy or sell securities for... [an] investment company, investment advisor, or collective
investment account." See Rule 2790(i)(1 OXD). Since hedge fund advisers (i.e., the general partner
and Knowledgeable Employees) almost always have authority to buy or sell securities for their
hedge funds (i.e., collective investment accounts), they will generally qualify as restricted persons.

Cf.id.
195. Cf Rule 2790(aX1). Hedge fund advisers often have significant interests in the hedge
funds that they advise. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 27.
196. See Rule 2790(cX 1). Registered mutual funds are entirely exempted on the assumption
that the percentage of beneficial interests owned therein by restricted persons will be extremely
minimal in view of the usually high number of non-restricted beneficial owners in such funds. See
Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note 189, at 62126. Furthermore, the 1940 Act's general
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Rule 2790's de minimis exemption, which provides that Rule 2790 does
not apply where the beneficial interests of Restricted Persons in an account
97
do not exceed, in the aggregate, 10% of such account (10% Tbreshhold).1
As a result, NASD members may sell new issues without limit to hedge

fund accounts provided that such accounts are no more than 10%
beneficially owned by Restricted Persons. 9' While beneficial ownership
by a hedge fund's affiliated Restricted Persons (i.e., advisers and
Knowledgeable Employees) may cause the 10% Threshold to be exceeded,
fund sales to unaffiliated Restricted Persons (i.e., NASD members, brokerdealers, and certain employees or owners thereof) may also cause the 10%
Threshold to be exceeded as well. Accordingly, hedge fund subscription
agreements should always determine initially whether prospective
investors are Restricted Persons.
However, even when a hedge fund is more 'than 10% beneficially
owned by Restricted Persons, separate accounting allocation procedures
("Carve-Outs") may be utilized to purchase new issues for such hedge
funds without violating Rule 2790's general prohibition.'" Carve-Outs
effectively allow hedge fund advisers to segregate the interests of
Restricted Persons from non-Restricted Persons when allocating new
issues.2' Prior to Rule 2790, Carve-Outs were generally effected through
the use of separate brokerage accounts whereby new issues were allocated
only to accounts beneficially owned by the hedge fund's non-Restricted
Persons.01 However, unlike the NASD's former IM 2110-1 interpretation,
Rule 2790 imposes no specific Carve-Out procedures. 2° So, for example,
Carve-Outs may be accomplished through (1)maintaining traditional
separate brokerage accounts, or (2) maintaining only one account and
adjusting the capital accounts of Restricted Persons to remove any gains

prohibition on affiliated transactions would prevent registered investment companies from
acquiring IPO shares and subsequently allocating them to the personal accounts of insiders. See
generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-17 (prohibiting investment company transactions with certain affiliated
persons and underwriters).
197. See Rule 2790(cX4).
198. Cf id.
199. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, supranote 189, at 621.29.

200. Id.
201. SEC Approves New Rule 2790 (Restrictions on the Purchase and Sale of IPOs of Equity
Securities); Replaces Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation, NASD Member Notice No. 0379, 831, 836 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter SEC Approves New Rule], available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groupstrulesregs/documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_005090.pdf
(last visited Dec. 22, 2005).
202. Id. See generally supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 2790's
replacement of IM 2110-1).
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or losses attributable to new issues. 2 3 Ultimately, permitting Carve-Outs
encourages hedge fund advisers (i.e., the general partner and
Knowledgeable Employees) to pool their own money and share the same
investment risks that their non-Restricted Person investors do with respect
to every asset type--except new issues when the 10% Threshold is
exceeded. 2'
Regardless of whether a hedge fund's beneficial interests are owned by
Restricted Persons, hedge fund advisers must provide a Rule 2790
compliance assurance to the NASD member seller twelve months prior to
purchasing new issues. 2 5 Accordingly, in order to ensure compliance with
such assurances, the Carve-Out procedures discussed above should be put
into place well in advance of acquiring any new issues.
V. COMMODITY POOLS

A. Commodity Regulation
Historically, sponsors that form, and hedge fund advisers too, hedge
funds investing in commodities20' will generally satisfy the definition of
a commodity pool operator 2°8 (CPO) and a commodity trading adviser2°
203. See SEC Approves New Rule, supra note 201, at 836.
204. See Self-Regulatory Organization, supra note 189, at 62129.
205. See Rule 2790(b)(2).
206. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV (discussing two examples of appropriate separate
accounting allocation procedures).
207. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C.S. § la(4):
[T]he term "commodity" means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish
potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil,

peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed,
peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen
concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, except onions as
provided in Public Law 85-839 (7 U.S.C. 13-1), and all services, rights, and
interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
in.

208. A commodity pool operator means:
any person engaged in a business that is of the nature of an investment trust,
syndicate, or similar form ofenterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits,

accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either directly or
through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or
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(CTA), respectively, under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 1 °
Unless exempted, CPOs and CTAs must generally register2'" under the
CEA. Once registered, CPOs and CTAs must, inter alia, comply with
certain prohibited transaction, disclosure, periodic reporting, and record
24'
keeping requirements,2 3 and, furthermore, complete annual self-audits
while submitting to periodic audits conducted by the National Futures
Association (NFA). 25" There are several exemptions that hedge fund
advisers may avail themselves of in order to trade commodities without
having to register as a CPO or CTA under the CEA.21 " However, the CPO
registration exemptions are generally much more limited than the various
CTA registration exemptions.

otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market or derivatives transaction execution
facility, except that the term does not include such persons not within the intent
of the definition of the term as the Commission may specify by rule, regulation,

or order.
7 U.S.C.S. § la(5).
209. A commodity trading adviser includes any person who:
[F]or compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications, writings, or electronic media, as to the value of
or the advisability of trading in-[I] any contract of sale ofa commodity for future
delivery made or to be made on or subject to the rules of a contract market or
derivatives transaction execution facility, [II] any commodity option...; or [III]
[certain] leverage transactions... [or] for compensation or profit, and is part of
a regular business, issues, or promulgates analyses or reports concerning any of
the activities referred to in clause (i).
7 U.S.C.S. § la(6).
210. The CEA is codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.S. §§ l-27f (2005).
211. CPOs and CTAs must register with the National Futures Association by filing a form 7-R.
See 17 C.F.R. § 3.10(a).
212. See 7 U.S.C.S. § 6m(l).
213. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.20-4.26 (setting forth such requirements with respect to
CPOs); 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.30-4.36 (setting forth such requirements with respect to CTAs).
214. See National Futures Association (NFA) Manual Rules, Compliance Rule 2-9, available
at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManua/manualCompliance.asp#2-9 (last visited on June 16,
2005); see also generally NFA, Self Examination Checklist, at http://www.nfa.futures.orgt
compliance/publications/selfexam/SelfExamChecklist.pdf (last visited on June 16, 2005).
215. See NFA Manual/Rules, Compliance Rule 2-5 (stating that members must fully agree to
comply with NFA audits), at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualCompliance.asp#2-5
(last visited on June 16, 2005).
216. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.13,4.14.
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B. Exemptionfrom CPO Registration
There are two primary exemptions that a hedge fund adviser
(Adviser(s)) may use to avoid having to register as a CPO under the CEA.
Regardless of the CPO registration exemption used, Advisers claiming
relief from CPO registration must file a duly signed notice with the NFA
containing certain contact information and the CPO registration exemption
relied upon.2"' Such notice is effective upon filing and must be filed by no
later than the
time a prospective investor is delivered a subscription
218
agreement.
Under the first primary CPO exemption,1 9 which places no limitations
upon the commodity interest positions of a hedge fund, 0 an Adviser need
not register as a CPO provided that the hedge fund advised is exempt from
registration under the 1933 Act 22' and the Adviser reasonably believes at
the time of purchase that: (1) each natural person investing in the hedge
fund is a "qualified eligible person"; 222 and (2) each non-natural person
investing in the hedge fund is either: (i) a "qualified eligible person"; or
(ii) an "accredited investor. 223 This exemption is impractical for many
hedge funds because it permits only non-natural persons in the hedge fund
to be an accredited investor; natural persons must generally either: (1) be
non-U.S. persons; or (2) satisfy the much loftier Qualified Purchaser
standard, which requires non-natural persons to own at least $5 million in
investments.224
Under the second, and generally more utilized, CPO exemption, an
Adviser need not register as a CPO provided that the commodity pool (i.e.,
hedge fund) advised is exempt from registration under the 1933 Act (e.g.,
vis-6-vis a Regulation D Rule 506 offering)"2 and one of the following two
additional tests is satisfied with respect to the hedge fund's commodity
interest positions: (1) the aggregate initial margin and premiums necessary
217. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(b)(1).
218. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.13(bX2)-(3).
219. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(4).
220. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(4)(placing no limitations upon commodity interests).
221. See discussion supra at Part II.A.5; supranote 67 and accompanying text.
222. The definition of a qualified eligible investor is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(a)(2) and
includes broker-dealers, Qualified Purchasers, certain registered investment advisers and CPOs,
Knowledgeable Employees, certain trusts, certain tax exempt organizations, and, inter alia, nonU.S. persons.
223. Accredited investor for purposes of this exemption means any person satisfying the
provisions of 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(aXl)-(3), (7) or (8). See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(aX4)(ii)(B).
224. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(4)(iiXA) with 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.7 (a)(2Xi)-(xii). See also 15
U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(aX5l)(A)(l).
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(3)(I).
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to establish such positions are limited to no more than 5% of the
liquidation value of the hedge fund's portfolio-after accounting for
unrealized profits and losses on any such positions;' 6 or (2) the aggregate
net notional value of such positions are limited to no more than 100% of
the liquidation value of the pool's portfolio-after accounting for
unrealized profits and losses on any such positions (CPO Percentage
Exemption)." The CPO Percentage Exemption is particularly more
readily available to hedge funds primarily comprised of U.S. natural
persons that, although accredited, are not Qualified Purchasers. The cost,
however, is that CPOs relying on the CPO Percentage Exemption are
subject to strict limitations with respect to their commodity investments.
Certain ambiguities may arise for hedge funds of funds (Investor
Funds) applying the limitations of the CPO Percentage Exemption due to
the indirect nature of their investments in other hedge funds (Investee
Funds). 228 Accordingly, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) has issued example guidance on the application of the CPO
Percentage Exemption with respect to such Investor Funds. 9 Four of the
examples within the CFTC's example guidance are worth noting in
particular. First, if an Investor Fund, which does not make any direct
commodity investments itself, invests in one or more Investee Funds that
do not satisfy the CPO Percentage Exemption, then the Investor Fund must
look through to the Investee Funds' commodity positions in order to
determine whether such Investor Fund is in compliance with the CPO
Percentage Exemption.230 Second, if the Investee Funds represent to the
Investor Fund that such Investee Funds will comply with the CPO
Percentage Exemption, and such Investor Fund does not have any direct
commodity investments, then such Investor Fund may rely upon such

226. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(A). In other words, no more than 5% of the hedge fimd's
assets may be used to purchase positions in commodities.
227. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(3Xii)(B). In other words, no more than 100% of the liquidation
value of the hedge fund's assets may be exposed to having to cover such hedge fund's commodity
positions.
228. For example, Investor Funds could invest 0% of their assets directly into commodities
and invest 100% of their assets in Investee Funds that may indirect expose such Investor Funds
to large commodity positions vis-4-vis the Investee Funds'direct investments in commodities. As
a result, an Investor Fund may appear to comply with the CPO Percentage Exemption when only
looking at such fund's direct investments, which are typically only comprised of Investee Funds.
However, if an Investor Fund's direct investments in Investee Funds are looked through, the CPO
Percentage Exemption may be significantly exceeded by the Investor Fund.
229. See generally Appendix A to Part 4; Appendix A to Part 4 can be found under Subpart
D of Part 4, immediately following 17 § C.F.R. 4.41.
230. Cf. Situation 1 under Appendix A to Part 4.
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" ' Third, if an Investor Fund does
representations for compliance purposes.23
not: (1) invest more than fifty percent of its assets into Investee Funds
(regardless of the amount of commodity positions held by such Investee
Funds); and (2) make direct investments in commodities, then such
Investor Fund will be in compliance with the CPO Percentage
Exemption.2 32 Finally, if an Investor Fund makes both direct investments
in commodities as well as investments in Investee Funds, then such
Investor Fund must treat its direct investments as a separate pool for
purposes of determining compliance with the CPO Percentage
Exemption; 33 the assets of the Investor Fund committed to Investee Funds
are also treated as a separate pool and must comply with the CPO
Percentage Exemption pursuant to one of the example guidance methods
discussed previously within this paragraph.3'

C. Exemptionfrom CTA Registration
Unlike the CPO registration exemptions, several CTA registration
exemptions are available to Advisers. First, an Adviser need not register
as a CTA if such Adviser is exempt from registration as a CPO 235 and such
Adviser's commodity trading advice is solely directed to the pool(s) for
which it is so exempt.2 36 Second, an Adviser need not register as a CTA if
it is already registered as a CPO provided that such CPO's commodity
trading advice is solely directed to the commodity pool(s) for which such
CPO is registered." Third, an Adviser is not required to register as a CTA
if,during the course of the preceding 12 months, such Adviser: (1) has not
furnished commodity trading advice to more than 15 persons; and (2) does
not hold itself out generally to the public as a commodity trading
adviser." Presently, each hedge fund advised by an Adviser counts as a
single client.2 39 Fourth, Advisers registered as investment advisers under
the Advisers Act may also obtain a CTA exemption provided that: (1) such
Adviser's business does not consist primarily of acting as a CTA; and (2)
such Adviser does not act as a CTA to any syndicate, investment trust, or
similar type of fund or enterprise engaged primarily in trading certain
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Situation 2 under Appendix A to Part 4.
See Situation 3 under Appendix A to Part 4.
See Situation 6 under Appendix A to Part 4.
Cf. Situation 6 under Appendix A to Part 4.
See discussion supra Part V.B.
See 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(aX5).
See 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(4).
See 7 U.S.C.S. § 6m(l); see also 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(aXO).
See 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(aX10)(i)(BXl).
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commodities. 2' Finally, a registered or exempt Adviser under the Advisers
Act need not register as a CTA if such Adviser's commodity trading
advice is directed solely for the use of hedge funds organized and operated
outside of the United States, provided, inter alia, that: (1) such Adviser is
not operating the hedge fund in order to avoid commodity pool operator
registration; (2) with the exception of certain Knowledgeable Employees,
solely Non-U.S. persons contribute capital to, and will own beneficial
interests in, the hedge fund pool; (3) no affiliated person of the hedge fund
conducts marketing activity for the purpose of soliciting participation from
U.S. persons; and (4) no affiliated person of the hedge fund conducts
marketing activity from within the United States. 241 Unlike the other CTA
exemptions discussed in this paragraph, the foregoing CTA exemption
requires a notice filing to be made that is similar to the notice filing
required for all CPO exemptions.242 The CPO and CTA notice filings may
be made within the same filing.
VI. TAX IMPLICATIONS
A. U.S. Taxable Investors in Offshore Hedge Funds

In 1986, Congress enacted the passive foreign investment company
(PFIC) rules to take away tax incentives from certain U.S. investors
making investments outside the United States.243 However, these rules go
beyond equalizing the playing field and create numerous disadvantages for
U.S. taxable investors who make investments in offshore hedge funds.
Accordingly, as discussed more fully below, ifa hedge fund intends to sell
its interests to U.S. taxable investors, it should, as a general matter,
organize an onshore fund or feeder fund for its U.S. taxable investors.
Under the federal tax code, a PFIC
means any foreign corporation [the most common form of offshore
fund] if (1) 75 percent or more of the gross income of such
corporation for the taxable year is passive income, or (2) the
average percentage of assets.., held by such corporation during

240. See 7 U.S.C.S. § 6m(3).
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(aX8)(i)(cXl)-(4).
242. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(8)(iii) with 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(bXl).
243. See Kevin M. Cunningham, The PFICRules: The Case of Throwing the Baby Out with
the Bathwater,21 VA. TAX REv. 387, 392 (2002).
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the taxable year which produce passive income or which are held
for the production of passive income is at least 50 percent.2'
"Passive income" includes, inter alia, income derived from dividends,
interest, and gains derived from transactions involving property that
produces interest or dividends (e.g., stocks, bonds, . . . etc.).245 Since
virtually all of an offshore hedge fund's income in a given year is passive
income and virtually all of its assets are held for the production of passive
income, most offshore hedge funds (i.e., those that are not partnerships)
are unequivocally PFICs.
When U.S. taxable investors make a gain off the sale of interests in
offshore hedge funds or receive certain distributions from offshore hedge
funds, certain punitive tax consequences occur. Under the regulatory
regime, gains received from an offshore hedge fund are "allocated ratably
to each day in the taxpayer's holding period.... 2" Any amount allocated
to: (1) the current year; and (2) any year before the offshore hedge fund
became a PFIC is to be taxed at ordinary income rates verses the more
favorable capital gain rates.24 7 As for amounts allocated to the period from
when the offshore hedge fund became a PFIC to the current year (the
deferred income period), such amounts are taxed at the highest marginal
rate, currently 35%,248 in effect for each year.2 49 In addition to the marginal
tax rate, an interest charge is imposed250 upon any amounts attributed to
the deferred income period in order to recover the "deemed benefit from
the deferral payment of the tax attributable to each year."25
PFIC rules can be avoided if the offshore hedge fund allows its U.S.
taxable investors to make an election (QEF Election)2 52 to treat the
offshore hedge fund as a "qualified electing fund" (QEF).2 53 In order for
such investors to make a QEF Election, the offshore hedge fund must be
able to properly calculate and provide such investors its ordinary earnings
and net capital gains each year.2 54 Each investor's pro rata share of the

244. 26 U.S.C.S. § 1297(a) (emphasis added).
245. 26 U.S.C.S. § 1297(b)(1); see also 26 U.S.C.S. § 954(cX).
246. 26 U.S.C.S. § 1291(a)(1)(A).
247. Cf 26 U.S.C.S. § 1291(a)(1)(B).
248. See generally 26 U.S.C.S. § 1(iX2).
249. Cf 26 U.S.C.S. § 1291(a)(1XC).
250. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1291(a)(1)(C).
251. Cunningham, supranote 243, at 407; see also 26 U.S.C.S. § 1291(a)(IXC).
252. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1295(b).
253. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a); see also 26 U.S.C.S. § 1293(a).
254. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a)(2). For the methods by which such calculations should be
made, see generally 26 C.F.R. 1.1293-1(a)(2).
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QEF's ordinary earnings and net capital gains are taxed as ordinary
income and long term capital gains, respectively, in the current year
whether or not distributions of such income is made to such investors.255
Accordingly, a U.S. taxable investor, similar to a U.S. taxable investor in
an onshore pass-through entity (e.g., a Delaware limited partnership), may
be forced to recognize a tax liability that is greater than the amount of any
distributions made by the offshore hedge fund. Underlying the U.S.
taxable investor's ability to make a QEF Election is a total dependency
upon the offshore hedge fund computing and providing the necessary
information annually.
An alternative to the QEF Election is the mark to market election,
which also avoids the harsh tax regime of the PFIC rules. This election,
however, is not as favorable as the QEF Election for most U.S. taxable
investors.256 Under the mark to market election, instead of utilizing the
offshore fund's income as the basis for tax liability, a U.S. taxable investor
must annually recognize as ordinary income the difference between his
adjusted basis and fair market value in the offshore hedge fund.257 Losses
are permitted only to the extent that net market to market gains were
previously included under the election for prior years.258 While the mark
to market method eliminates the tax consequences under the PFIC rules,
downsides exist. In lieu of not taking into account the earnings of the
offshore hedge fund when determining tax liability (as is the case under
the QEF Election), U.S. taxable investors must realize as ordinary income,
under the mark to market election, what would otherwise be capital gains
under the QEF Election. Additionally, like other pass-through entities, a
U.S. taxable investor may be forced to recognize a tax liability that is
greater than the amount of any distributions made by the offshore hedge
fund.
B. US. Taxable Investors in OnshoreFunds

Since domestic hedge funds are structured as pass-through limited
liability entities (e.g., limited partnerships), 259 there is no entity level
taxation and U.S. taxable investors therein only incur tax liability in their

255. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1293(a).
256. U.S. taxable investors investing in hedge fund of funds will need to utilize the mark to
market election since the QEF election is only available to the first investor in a chain of ownership
in an offshore hedge fund. Cf. 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 1293(a)(1), 1298(a)(1)(B).
257. See 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 1296(aX1), (cXl)(A).
258. See 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 1296(aX2), (cXl)(B).
259. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
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separate or individual capacities. 2' Accordingly, such investors must
include in their own income tax returns their respective share of the hedge
fund's income, gains, losses, deductions and credits irrespective of
whether or not the hedge fund actually made any distributions of such
income.26 Gains or losses on the sale of interests in hedge funds are taxed
as capital gains or losses.262
C. U.S. Tax-Exempt Investors
U.S. tax-exempt investors (i.e., 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3) entities or
pension plans) are generally subject to taxation on unrelated business
taxable income (UBTI).263 UBTI is any organization's gross income
derived from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by such
organization after taking into consideration certain deductions and
modifications. 2" Such modifications exclude from UBTI most sources of
income and gain that a tax-exempt investor would receive from
investments in a fund (i.e., dividends, interest, payments with respect to
security loans, and, inter alia, gains or losses from the sale, exchange or
other disposition of most investment property).265 However, debt financed
property (i.e., property acquired with acquisition indebtedness that is held
to produce income) is not excluded from UBTI. 2 Accordingly, certain
hedge funds containing U.S. tax-exempt investors may cause such
investors to sustain UBTI if such funds utilize leverage (e.g., margin
trading) when acquiring investment assets.
However, U.S. tax-exempt investors may generally avoid UBTI by
investing in hedge funds (i.e., those utilizing leverage) that are organized
offshore in corporate form as non flow-throughs and which do not engage
in a U.S. trade or business. 26 7 The corporate form prevents UBTI from
"flowing through" to the U.S. tax-exempt investor (corporate double
taxation is generally not a concern either since the corporation is organized

260. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 701.
261. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 702; see also 26 U.S.C.S. § 704.
262. See Allen L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Verses the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133
(2003). For rules pertaining to capital gains or losses, see generally 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 1201-1298.
263. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 51 1(a)(1).
264. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 512(a)(1).
265. See 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 512(b)(1), (5).
266. See 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 514(a)(l), (bXl); see also generally 26 U.S.C.S. § 514(c) (defining
acquisition indebtedness).
267. Cf LEMIE ET AL., supranote 19, at 203-05.
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in a tax-free jurisdiction such as the Cayman or British Virgin Islands).'"
As such, the only income the U.S. tax-exempt investor will receive from
the offshore corporation will be in the form of dividends, which are
specifically excluded from UBTI. 269 The fact that the dividends are being
received from a PFIC is of no concern to U.S. tax-exempt investors either
since they are, by nature, "tax-exempt." Finally, traditional trading in U.S.
securities and commodities by an offshore corporation are generally
exempted from activities that constitute a "trade or business within the
United States."27 0
D. Non-US. Investors in OnshoreHedge Funds
Naturally, non-U.S. investors investing in either onshore or offshore
hedge funds will be subject to the tax laws of their home jurisdictions.
From a U.S. standpoint, however, non-U.S. investors investing in hedge
funds organized in the United States will generally have no tax liability on
capital gains. 27' However, such non-U.S. investors are generally subject to
a 30% withholding tax on all income received from certain sources within
the United States (e.g., dividends and certain real estate income). 272 NonU.S. investors bear the economic impact of this withholding whether they
invest in U.S. assets through a U.S. or non-U.S. fund, but the withholding
is more apparent to them if they invest in a U.S. vehicle. Also, many nonU.S. investors do not like the perceived transparency to U.S. tax regulators
that comes with investing in a U.S. fund along with the risk of U.S. estate
tax for individual investors. Accordingly, non-U.S. investors generally
avoid making investments in hedge funds organized in the United States.

268. See generallySEC Hedge Fund Report, supranote 17, at 10 (discussing UBTI generally
and offshore jurisdictional preferences).
269. Cf.generally26 U.S.C.S. § 512(b)(1) (excluding dividends from UBTI).
270. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 864(bX2).
271. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.881-2(a)(1) (stating that a foreign corporation to which this section
applies is not subject to the tax imposed by section 11 or section 1201(a)); see also generally 26
U.S.C.S. § 871(aXl).
272. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 871(aX1XA); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.881-2(aX2). Portfolio interest,
however, is excluded. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 871(h).
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VII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

A. Initial Considerations
Tax considerations aside, several other factors must be considered
when organizing hedge funds. 3(c)(1) hedge funds2 73 organized in the
United States must include both foreign and U.S. investors when
determining the number of their beneficial owners.2 74 However, funds
organized outside the United States need only include U.S. residents when
determining the number of beneficial owners in its securities.2 " As such,
offshore funds may have an unlimited number of foreign beneficial owners
in addition to 100 U.S. resident beneficial owners. Accordingly, funds
anticipating strong demand from both foreign and domestic investors,
should, at the very least, set up an offshore hedge fund.
In light of the unlimited number of non-U.S. investors permitted in
hedge funds organized offshore, the 30% withholding tax on income
distributed to non-U.S. investors, and the QEF Election that U.S. taxable
investors can make to avoid PFIC tax consequences, it may appear
unnecessary for a sponsor to form an onshore hedge fund for its U.S.
taxable investors. However, U.S. taxable investors are hesitant to invest in
offshore hedge funds for a number of reasons. Many investors are simply
reluctant to be entangled with PFIC rules and the related legal fees
associated with them. Even when investors are willing to make a QEF
Election, they may have difficulty in requiring the offshore hedge fund to
agree to certain accounting procedures necessary for them to make the

QEF Election. Additionally, U.S. taxable investors generally prefer the
flexibility and peace of mind afforded to them under Delaware's laws and

judicial expertise. Accordingly, it is generally advisable for a sponsor to
organize, for tax and marketing purposes, an onshore hedge fund for its
U.S. taxable investors and a separate offshore fund for foreign and U.S.

tax-exempt investors.2

273. See generallydiscussion supraPart IA.
274. Cf generally§ 3(cX1), 15 U.S.C.S. § 80a-2(a)(28), (a)(8) (making no reference to U.S.
residency or citizenship with respect to persons having beneficial ownership in a 3(cXl) fund).
275. Cf. Touche Remnant & Co; Stein, Roe & Farnham, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 27,
1984); Investment Funds Institute of Canada, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 4, 1996) (stating that,
based upon Touche Remnant & Co., issuers count toward the 3(c)(1) limit both beneficial owners
of securities privately placed in the United States, as well as U.S. residents who beneficially own
securities issued and acquired outside the United States); see also FRANKEL, supra note 131, §§
6.04[D], 24.01[F].
276. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 9; see also discussion supra Part VI.C
(discussing UBTI implications with respect to U.S. tax-exempt investors).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/7

50

Crenshaw: Hedge Funds: Regulatory, Tax, and Organizational Considerations

HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORY, TAX AND ORGANZTIONAL CONSIDERAIONS

Hedge funds organized in the United States are generally organized as
Delaware limited partnerships. " In addition to the benefits of passthrough taxation,278 the organizational structure of a limited partnership is
particularly conducive to hedge funds. Investors in the hedge fund become
the limited partners while the investment adviser 79 to the hedge fund
(typically the fund sponsor) usually becomes the general partner.28 °
General partners, unlike limited partners, however, are personally liable
for the limited partnership independent of the existence of the limited
partnership. 281 Accordingly, hedge fund sponsors typically organize the
investment adviser as a limited liability entity (e.g., a limited liability
company) to avoid personal liability. Any interests issued to limited
partners should be non-voting interests 282 to allow the general partner
complete discretion over the limited partnership's investments. The
issuance of true non-voting interests may also help prevent concerns
regarding 3(c) look-through provisions since no limited partner will ever
own 10% or more of the "voting" securities of the hedge fund.283
For reasons previously discussed, hedge fund sponsors deciding to
offer an onshore and offshore hedge fund to U.S. taxable investors and
non-U.S. investors, respectively, can, inter alia, administer an onshore and
offshore fund separately (a "side by side" structure) or jointly through a
"master feeder" structure.28
B. Side by Side Structure
Under the side by side structure, the investment adviser to both funds
manages two separate pools of assets that mirror each other (e.g., an
onshore hedge fund for the U.S. taxable investors and an offshore hedge
fund for the non-U.S. and U.S. tax exempt investors). Such U.S. and non-

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 9.
See generally 26 U.S.C.S. § 701.
The sponsor of a hedge fund is usually the investment adviser.
Cf.SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 9.
See 6 Del. C. §§ 17-403(b), (d)(5); see also 6 Del. C. § 17-303(a).
See supra text accompanying note 41.
Seegenerally discussion supra Part II.A.2. Given the potential for manipulation in multi

tiered transactions, the SEC has stated that if an entity is formed for the sole purpose of investing
in a section 3(c)( 1) company, then such an entity's underlying investors may be counted toward the
3(c)(1) company's beneficial owners. See Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr.
23, 1992); Handy Place Investment Partnership, SEC No-Action Letter (July 19, 1989). As a
general rule, the general partner's interests in the hedge fund are considered not to be voting
securities in view of the significant control the general partner exerts over the limited partnership.
See Colony Realty Partners 1986, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 27, 1988).
284. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 9.
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U.S. cloned funds will generally not be integrated for purposes of
determining the onshore fund's 100 beneficial owner limitation. 85 For the
fund sponsor, who typically serves as the investment adviser to both hedge
funds, a side by side structure is administratively inconvenient because
two pools of assets are separately managed despite both pools sharing
identical investment objectives.
C. MasterFeeders

A master feeder structure not only eliminates the administrative
inconveniences associated with a side by side structure, but also offers
increased efficiencies in transaction costs and portfolio management since

assets are aggregated. 8 6 Under the master feeder structure, feeder funds

are organized in various jurisdictions for various purposes (e.g., a
Delaware limited partnership for U.S. taxable investors). The feeder funds,
in turn, invest 100% of their assets into the master fund28 7 where all
investment activity occurs. 88
When utilizing a master feeder structure, the master fund generally
should be organized offshore as an entity taxed as a partnership for U.S.
purposes (in order to avoid PFIC issues, which generally apply only to
foreign corporations)28 9 for the benefit of both non-U.S. investors and the
hedge fund's sponsor. Because of the tax and appearance concerns
described above, 9 ' non-U.S. investors may be reluctant to invest in an
onshore master fund. Additionally, a hedge fund organized in the United
States must count both non-U.S. investors and U.S. residents when
determining the number of its beneficial owners under section 3(a)(1)
" '
while an offshore hedge fund need only count its U.S. residents.29
285. See Shoreline Fund, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 11, 1994).
286. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, at 9. Master feeders can (1) eliminate
administrative burdens of splitting trade tickets; (2) alleviate allocation issues; (3) increase
collateral available for swap and other leveraged transactions; and (4) facilitate the ability to qualify
as a QIB. See George J. Mazin, One Size Does Not Fit All: Deciding Whether a Master/Feeder
Structure Makes Sense, MFA REP. (Oct. 1999), http://www.lowenstein.com/new/One-Size.html
(last visited on Dec. 22, 2005).
287. It should also be noted that section 12 under the 1940 Act would normally preclude the

use of a master feeder structure when a registered investment company is involved. However,
recognizing the utility in master feeder structures, Congress enacted section 12(d)(1)(E), which
exempts the fund holding limitations imposed by sections 12(d)(1XA) and (B) for companies whose

only security is that of another investment company.
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Cf SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 17, n.26.
See 26 U.S.C.S. § 1297(a).
Cf discussion supra Part VI.D.
See discussion infra Part VII.A and accompanying text at notes 253-54.
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Although a U.S. master fund on the surface would only have two investors

(the onshore and offshore feeders), both feeders would be looked through
since each was formed for the sole purpose of investing in the master fund.
Accordingly, the master fund should be organized offshore to prevent non-

U.S. investors in the offshore feeder(s) from being attributed to the master
fund's 100 beneficial owner limitation. Use of an offshore master can raise
withholding issues for U.S. investors, but these can be structured around.
A downside of the master feeder structure, however, among other
things, is that it is more expensive to set up and run.292 Since the master
fund is typically organized as a partnership, PFIC problems are generally
avoided. However, given the master's partnership status, U.S. tax-exempt
investors are usually placed into an offshore feeder corporation in order to
avoid UBTI.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Hedge funds have become an increasingly popular alternative
investment vehicle to traditional investment companies (e.g., mutual
funds), which are heavily regulated under the 1940 Act. However,
numerous factors must be considered when organizing a hedge fund in
order to avoid regulatory violations and to efficiently organize its
structure. A hedge fund sponsor must first decide whether a 3(c)(1) or
3(c)(7) exemption is best suited for the hedge fund. A 3(c)(7) fund is better
suited if the sponsor desires to sell the hedge fund to a large number of
very high net worth individuals or institutions. A 3(c)(1) fund is better
suited if the sponsor plans to sell the hedge fund to less than 100 hundred
beneficial owners who do not satisfy the qualified purchaser requirements
under section 3(c)(7). The restrictions of both exemptions must be strictly
followed to maintain an exemption from the definition of an investment
company under section 3(a). Given the numerical limitations in a 3(c)(1)
exemption, special precautions must be considered (e.g., look through
tests, Knowledgeable Employee exemptions, and integration issues).
Regardless of the exemption chosen, a public offering of the securities
cannot be made. Strictly complying with the safe-harbor provisions of
Regulation D's Rule 506, which is the most favorable private offering
exemption, will ensure that a public offering has not been made.
Additionally, 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) funds must comply with the fund holding
limitations set forth in sections 12(d)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i).
292. See Mazin, supra note 286. Although beyond the scope of this Note, certain liquidity and
conflict issues may arise in a master feeder structure as well. Id.
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Generally, most hedge funds should limit investments by certain
ERISA Plans to no more than 25% or more of the value of any class of
their equity interests in order to avoid becoming an ERISA Fiduciary and
having to refrain from certain Prohibited Transactions. Despite limited
Prohibited Transaction relief afforded to qualified portfolio asset
managers, ERISA restraints on self dealing simply pose too many
constraints for many hedge funds.
Hedge fund advisers opting to invest in "new issues" must ensure that
certain Restricted Persons are generally not allocated any shares of new
issues acquired by such hedge fund. A number of carve-out procedures
exist in order to effectively allow hedge fund advisers to segregate the
interests of Restricted Persons from non-Restricted Persons when
allocating new issues.
Hedge funds investing in commodities might subject certain affiliated
persons of the hedge fund to registration as a CPO or CTA under the CEA.
However, numerous exemptions exist from such CEA registration
requirements.
If the fund sponsor intends to sell the hedge fund to both onshore and
offshore investors, then the sponsor should form an onshore and offshore
fund, utilizing entities with pass-through taxation for the U.S. taxable
investors and corporate entities for the foreign/U.S. tax-exempt investors,
respectively. Organizing the hedge fund in this manner properly balances
the need of U.S. taxable investors to avoid the PFIC rules with the need of
foreign and U.S. tax-exempt investors to avoid the direct impact of the
thirty percent withholding tax and UBTI, respectively, on any income
distributions. The fund sponsor can either organize the onshore and
offshore funds as side by side entities or as master feeders. By employing
a master feeder structure, the fund sponsor will reduce the administrative
inconveniences of managing two pools of assets while increasing
efficiencies in portfolio management and transaction costs.
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